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Criminal Procedure Entitlements,
Professionalism, and Lawyering Norms
DARRYL Y. BROWN*
This Article explores how social norms affect lawyers' andjudges' behavior
and, thereby, the content of both legal entitlements and the practice of ethics. It
draws from several large studies of local criminal law practice that, until now,
have not been used in legal scholarship. Norms in law practice often conflict
with legal entitlements. Yet the Article argues that such norms sometimes are
defensible and necessary responses to tensions in public values and conflicts
between policymaking institutions; they identify the need for doctrinal change,
rather than changes in law practice. In other instances, however, norms neither
reconcile such conflicts nor devise efficient options to formal rules. Given
agency problems in law practice, norms sometimes are rent-seeking actions by
lawyers and judges. In addition, they are driven by lawyers' and judges'
ideological commitments; norms serve personal visions ofjust outcomes and fair
procedures. Finally, because lawyers observe norms that conflict with formal
entitlements--leading them explicitly to disavow or subvert rules-norms reveal
how notions of professionalism are revised to accord with actions that
undermine both client interests and public values. Focusing on the link between
lawyering practice and doctrine, the Article suggests ways courts can respond to
norms, and it surveys strategies for reforming undesirable norms.
I. INTRODUCTION
One way to describe how attorneys practice law is to say that clients present
sets of facts and circumstances, and attorneys look to substantive and procedural
law for options that will best achieve the client's objectives. Attorneys may need
to help clients clarify objectives-goals may evolve as attorneys highlight legal
options and implications for clients' nonlegal concerns. Of course, attorneys are
then limited only by financial resources and rules of professionalism.
This is the traditional vision implicit in legal education as well as in rules of
legal ethics; lawyers consider all legal options and provide zealous representation
within the available budget.' The picture is in an important sense one of a blank
* Assistant Professor of Law, Washington & Lee University School of Law. This Article
benefited both from insightful comments by my colleagues Barry Sullivan and Lash Larue,
who read earlier versions of the manuscript, and from spirited discussions in faculty workshops
at Washington & Lee, the University of Florida, and the University of Denver law schools. I
am grateful to the Sydney Lewis Law Center for research support.
1 One can refine the picture by noting the skill that comes with experience; veteran
practitioners may know informal means to achieve client goals. See WILLIAM H. SIMON, TBE
PRACTCE OF JuS'nc&: A THEORY OF LAwYuRs' ETRCS 45-46 (1998) (describing the
"dominant view" of lawyer advancing client interests); see generally What Lawyers Know:
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slate on which the lawyer chooses among all formal legal options and perhaps
some informal ones. For that reason, the picture is inadequate. Lawyers do not
practice on a blank slate; they practice in contexts. Contexts include not only the
circumstances in which client problems arise or the dynamics of the attorney-
client relationship2 but also the legal community. Some practice contexts
drastically constrain the options-including legal entitlements-realistically
available to attorneys, greatly influence their judgment about which strategies are
available, and significantly affect client counseling. They also change the
effective content of legal rules.
This description builds on the premise that has found broad application in
social science and, more recently, in legal scholarship: social organization and, in
particular, community norms are almost always more important influences on
individual conduct than formal rules. In criminal justice policy, scholars
including Tracey Meares have built upon social organization theory to suggest
that law enforcement can more effectively address criminal conduct by focusing
more on norms than rules-by strengthening "social control through the
generation... of effective community norms" because norms affect conduct
more than formal rules. 3 More broadly, social organization theorists have studied
a wide variety of social contexts to build the thesis that individual preferences are
shaped by institutional settings. Norms take on a rule-like status and define the
acceptable ways to make routine judgments; although they are contingent upon
social practices, they often seem driven by material imperatives.4 Finally, a
corresponding interest in behavioralism has gained significant attention in legal
Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and the Functions of Theory, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313
(1995) (discussing attorneys' assessments of multiple factors in strategic decisions).
2 See, e.g., DAVID A. BINDER Er AL., LAwYERs AS COUNsELORS 4 (1991) (noting that
lawyers need both "industry knowledge," referring to the circumstances in which clients'
problems arise, and "extralegal knowledge," arising from clients' varying "knowledge,
emotion and sophistication" and readiness to make decisions, in order to devise effective
solutions from legal principles).
3 Tracey L. Meares, Place and Crime, 73 CI.-KENTr L. REV. 670 (1998); see also id. at
669, 670-77. Similarly, recent empirical work on delinquency, studied at the neighborhood
level, explains the causes of 'legal cynicism" (meaning anomie or disillusion about law) and
accompanying law-breaking behavior by structural characteristics of the community rather than
looking only to individual-level beliefs or choices. See generally Robert L. Sampson & Dawn
Jeglum Bartusch, Legal Cynicism and (Subcultural?) Tolerance of Deviance: The
Neighborhood Context ofRacial Differences, 32 L. & SOc'Y REV. 777 (1999).
4 See Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. Soc. REV. 147,
147-51, 157 (1983); John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations: Formal
Structure as Myth and Ceremony, 83 AM. J. Soc. 340, 341-47, 355-59 (1977); Lynne G.
Zucker, The Role of Institutionalization in Cultural Persistence, 42 AM. Soc. REV. 726, 727-
28(1977).
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scholarship that helps explain the operation of norms and offers compatible
insights on how decisionmaking is affected by context 5
This Article describes how those insights apply to lawyers as they make
professional decisions in practice, particularly in state criminal courts. In
localized, close-knit practice settings, lawyers and judges often adopt strong
social norms. This Article will call them practice norms because they govern law
practice. On crucial issues, attorney judgment is affected by norms that coerce or
persuade attorneys to choose options they would not otherwise choose, for
reasons other than the client's best interest. Entitlements that formally exist for
clients-discovery rights, expert witnesses, jury trials-can be unavailable in
practice. Legal professionals effectively rewrite substantive and procedural
entitlements granted by case law or legislation.
Examining law practice through the lens of social norms provides a
perspective for two related projects. The first posits that practice norms provide
implicit critiques of rules or doctrines and the feasibility of some entitlements.
This Article argues that despite their conflict with formal law and client interests,
practice norms are not per se a bad development Rather, practice norms can
serve as a useful form of critique for formal entitlements.
Many entitlements, such as the right to a jury trial in misdemeanor cases, are
created by judicial decision. Yet the real availability of that formal right depends
on the support of the executive and legislative branches.6 Trial judges and
lawyers must respond to higher-level institutional choices. In doing so, they
sometimes sub rosa revise legal entitlements. Legislatures, commissions, and
appellate courts set rules that practitioners evaluate and reject or accept in light of
conditions in which those rules operate-material constraints, justice
considerations in specific cases, and player self-interest or ideological
5 Behavioralism generates theories of decisionmaking that raise implications for doctrine
and practice in such areas as contract negotiation and products liability. See, eg., Ion D.
Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market
Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420 (1999) (products liability); Russell Korobkin, Inertia
and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form
Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583 (1999) (contract negotiation) [hereinafter Inertia and
Preference]; Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CoRNELL
L. Ray. 608 (1998) (same).
6 Recent work recognizing dynamic relationships between institutional actors has
provided important insights on the limited efficacy of appellate review as a means of social
change or rule creation without legislative support. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.L 331 (1991)
(statutory interpretation); Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights
Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7 (1994) (civil rights); William 3. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship
Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.I 1 (1997) (criminal
procedure rights).
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commitments. Norms confront the same trade off between fairness and
efficiency that occurs at the level of doctrine and statutes. In some instances,
norms are defensible responses based on information more readily available to
trial-level actors than to appellate courts or legislators. Sometimes, however, they
are unreliable critiques of rules, because of lawyers' and judges' ability (due to
agency problems) to serve their own interests or ideological preferences. In both
cases, norms strike different trade offs than public lawmaking. This distinction in
norms' functions and legitimacy yields a taxonomy of practice norms (presented
in Part I) that maps which norms are amenable to change by local lawyers and
which, conversely, appellate courts should take as signals to re-examine rules.
The second project here, a response to recent literature of lawyer
professionalism, is raised by the first. This Article suggests that practice norms
often lead to lawyering that is problematic under either model of the two
prominent approaches to lawyering ethics-William Simon's recent book-length
development of his ethical discretion thesis, and competing approaches that urge
a more client-centered commitment, represented by Stephen Pepper and David
Binder. Practice choices are in great part products of local contexts. Norms
demonstrate how local work settings lead attorneys to construct very different
models of law and lawyering, which affect both doctrine and client interests.7
Practice norms shape the content of professionalism notions. Its socially
contingent nature explains why professionalism does not overcome norms that
conflict with formal rules and reflect self-interested action by lawyers or judges
(even though most are concerned with their reputations). 8
Legal scholarship gives ample attention to the purported effects of legal rules
but too little attention to contextual factors that affect lawyer judgment as well as
court decisions. The conjunction of these two projects offers a way to integrate
analysis of typically separate topics: lawyering and doctrine. At the level where
doctrine is put in practice, the two are inseparable. Lawmakers, including courts,
must look to practice to assess the feasibility of doctrine; practice defines the
working content of substantive, procedural, and ethical rules, which are often in
sharp contrast to formal statements.
This project looks at norms as they affect attorneys' strategic judgments for
7 See Robert L. Nelson & David M. Trubek, Arenas ofProfessionalism: The Professional
Ideologies of Lawyers in Context, in LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAwYER s' PRACnCES 177, 188
(Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992).
8 Economic analyses of lawyering tend to ignore the possibility that professionalism could
constrain self-interested action. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, The Path of the Law Firm: A
Comment on Ribstein's "Ethical Rules, Agency Costs, and Law Firm Structure," 84 VA. L.
REV. 1761, 1766-67 (1998) (criticizing Ribstein for discounting ethical commitments and
suggesting they can have a substantial effect); Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Agency Costs,
andLaw Firm Structure, 84 VA. L. REV. 1707, 1715 (1998).
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individual clients and claims.9 To do so, this Article relies on recent empirical
studies of courts that have received little attention in legal scholarship'0 as well
as more anecdotal accounts of trial-level criminal law practice, primarily from
appellate opinions. This Article proceeds in several parts. Part HI reviews the
concept and definition of norms, especially in recent legal scholarship. Building
on empirical research of courts and law practice, this Article introduces several
examples of practice norms that undermine zealous representation, client
interests, and public values. It then identifies two functions that practice norms
serve-efficiency and justice. The former has received much attention in legal
literature, the latter relatively little. Part II analyzes several specific practice
norms for their varying implications for parties, attorneys, and doctrine. Then,
relying on recent scholarship on lawyering ethics, Part IV describes how norms
often mislead attorneys from their ostensible professional roles and thereby
undermine the key interests they should serve-client preferences and public
interests.
Part V explores why norms retain such influence by looking at several
explanations for their persistence, which include behavioral theory, ideological
trends toward nonadversarial processes within the formal justice system, and
agency problems in the attorney-client relationship. This Article links practice
norms to criticisms of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) and managerial
judging, which are other informal substitutes for formal adjudication that, like
norms, pose special risks for low income litigants. Finally, Part VI considers the
wide variation in practice norms among comparable settings-the phenomenon
of legal pluralism--to explore the possibilities of reducing or reforming
undesirable norms and encouraging preferable ones. Concluding remarks explore
the level of responsibility lawyers bear for perpetuating norms even though their
construction of norms is not always deliberate or fully voluntary.
If. DEFINING AND EXPLAINING PRACTICE NORMS
A. What Are Norms?
Legal scholars, following longer standing work by social scientists, have
9 Cf. Nelson & Trubek, supra note 7, at 188 (urging "contextual examination of micro-
encounters in different... settings" for a "complete account of the social construction of
professionalism").
10 In addition to published studies, I was granted access to a primary data set consisting of
extensive interviews with attorneys and judges from a jurisdiction with a relatively close-knit
professional community. This archive is part of the largest empirical study of criminal courts to
date, conducted by Eisenstein, Nardulli, and Flemming. I am grateful to Professor Eisenstein
for arranging my access to the archive. See infra note 13 (documenting little use of these
studies in legal scholarship).
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given increasing attention to the role of norms in law, particularly the insights
norms can bring to economic analysis of law.11 Legal studies focus on how
norms affect behavior and dispute resolution among wide varieties of groups-
voters, merchants, ranchers, and employers. 12 Yet legal norms scholarship has
thus far given no attention to how norms affect legal professionals and the
adjudication process, despite a wealth of empirical research on law practice and
local courts that documents lawyers' and judges' behavior.13
Norms, strictly defined, refer not merely to widely observed and repeated
conduct (say, that most people sleep at night) nor merely to widely shared values
or customs. Rather, they describe conduct that is either encouraged by rewards or
enforced by sanctions. 14 In this sense, norms are rules, which are violated only at
a cost. Norms are most likely to arise (and to be most effective) in relatively
small groups who have regular, repeated interaction with each other, so that they
possess both information about past behavior and future opportunities to impose
sanctions or rewards.15
It is well known that norms exist in some practice contexts--especially state
and local courts, in both large cities and smaller towns. 16 Every lawyer who
1 Recent legal interest in norms is probably attributable in large part to Robert C.
Ellickson's influential book, Order Without Law. See ROBERT C. ELuICKSON, ORDER
WrrHouT LAW (1991); see also Symposium, Law, Economics, & Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
1643 (1996).
12 See generally ELuCKSON, supra note 11 (ranchers); Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a
Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L.
REv. 1765 (1996) (merchants); Richard L. Hasen, Voting Without Law?, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
2135 (1996) (voters); Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, The Enforceability of Norms
and the Employment Relationship, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1913 (1996) (employment).
13 That inattention is part of a broader deficit in legal scholarship to take account of the
substantial empirical research on lawyers, courts, and other legal practice settings. The largest
data set of its kind-a study of nine criminal court jurisdictions by Nardulli, Flemming, and
Eisenstein (on which this Article relies)-is a key example. A 1999 Westlaw search reveals no
legal scholarship has more than referenced the work without comment in a footnote. Search of
Westlaw, JLR Library (May 12,2000).
14 see ELLICKsON, supra note 11, at 123-26; Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a
Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U.
PA. L. REV. 1643, 1656 (1996); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and
Regulation ofNorms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338,350-51 (1997).
15 See ELUCKSON, supra note 11, at 177-82, 238; see also PETER F. NARDULLI ET AL,
THE TENOR OF JUSTTCE 124 (1988); McAdams, supra note 14, at 386-91 (contrasting group-
based norms, which arise among tight-knit groups, and societal norms).
16 See RoY B. FLEMMING Er AL., THE CRAFT OF JuSTICE 10 (1992) (describing how
"grapevine" gossip helps "enforc[e] norms" in courthouse connnunities); id at 137 (describing
"[c]ourthouse communities" as tight-knit "[t]hickets of informal relations"); MILTON
HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENE OF PROSECUrORs, JUDGES, AND DEFENSE
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practices in such a setting-where she frequently appears before the same judges
or deals with the same group of attorneys-can describe local customs and
practices, some of which amount to norms. Moreover, practice in local court
communities, particularly criminal courts, has been extensively studied by social
scientists.17 Norms that especially undermine client interests, however, are
unevenly distributed among practice settings and client groups; practice norms
hurt some parties more than others.
Because norms operate at the "ground level" of law practice in local settings,
data are hard to gather.18 For a flavor of the norms at issue here, consider some
illustrations.19 A well-known example is the norm against jury trials. Empirical
studies20 and anecdotal accounts from practice21 confirm that jury trials are an
ATORNEYS (1975); NARDULU ET AL., supra note 15, at 124,376. There are several extensive
studies of attorneys in state court criminal practice settings that document norms, customs of
practice, and common patterns of lawyering conduct. There are substantially fewer such studies
in either the context of civil practice or elite, federal court practice for wealthy clients. But see
generally HERBERT M. KRrrzER, THE JUSTICE BROKER: LAWYERS AND ORDINARY LIGATION
(1990) (presenting data from Civil Litigation Research Project); KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING
WHITE COUAR CRIuE (1985) (presenting a study of elite attorneys who represent wealthy
defendants in white-collar, mostly federal, criminal cases); see also KENNETH KREsSE, TlE
PROCESS OF DIvORCE 159 (1985) (describing the "professional dilemma" that "while the
official code of conduct prescribes a zealous pursuit of the client's interests, the informal norms
and the realities of professional life prompt compromise and cooperation").
17 While the goals of those studies vary, they often describe practice norms that are
widely followed and enforced by attorneys and judges. Heumann's study of Connecticut
criminal courts, for example, was designed to study how novice attorneys adapt to plea
bargaining practices designed by experienced practitioners, who radically revise new
graduates' conceptions of appropriate practice. See HEUMANN, supra note 16, at 1-7.
18 See KRrIzER, supra note 16, at vii, 123 (noting even the well-funded Civil Litigation
Research Project, based on extensive attorney surveys and interviews along with a variety of
quantitative analyses of cases and outcomes, had "virtually no specific information on" how
relationships among clients, courts, and other attorneys might affect "the details of the [work]
content of... various" lawyering activities, including settlement negotiations and discovery).
Cf Diane Vaughan, Rational Choice, Situated Action, and the Social Control of
Organizations, 32 L. & SOC'Y REV. 23, 53 (1998) (noting that attempts to study the related
problem of decisionmaking within institutions face the same problems of gathering data
because "interviewees may not be able to articulate many of the factors that affected their
actions'). While Flemming, Eisenstein, and Nardulli's extensive study of criminal courts
gathered notable examples of practice norms, norms were not the primary focus of the research,
and attorneys and judges are likely to under-report such norms.
19The focus of this Article will be criminal practice settings because the empirical data
from those contexts is much more extensive than that for civil practice, but throughout it will
suggest some analogies and applications for civil practice where possible.
20 See, e.g., HEUMANN, supra note 16; NARDUJ Er AL, supra note 15; David Lynch,
The Impropriety of Plea Agreements: A Tale of Two Counties, 19 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 115
(1994).
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infrequent form of case resolution not solely for legitimate reasons, such as the
parties freely reaching a plea or settlement. Jury trials are also suppressed by
judges and attorneys-backed by sanctions against attorneys and litigants-who
disapprove of them in certain contexts and who express that disapproval
openly.22
Norms may also govern the resources and procedures committed to trials.
Under Ake v. Oklahoma,23 indigent parties have a due process right to obtain
funds from the court for expert assistance. Lower courts in many jurisdictions
have not limited this right to serious crimes, yet trial courts sometimes regulate
access to Ake funds through a norm. Consider demands for Ake finds for experts
to challenge breath-test results supporting misdemeanor DWI charges.2 4 (The
test can be inaccurate on some people, which is especially important in close
cases.) A trial judge may feel compelled by case law to grant the funds
requested. However, a judge still can chill the exercise of that right by, say, more
harshly sentencing defendants who exercise the right but later lose the trial.25
This chilling signals local attorneys to exercise the right more judiciously than
the doctrinal language suggests. 6
211 can offer a number of such examples from my former practice as a public defender.
Upon announcing a jury demand in one case, the judge-who had little if any more
information about the case than the indictment-responded, "no, no, no, we're not going to
have a jury trial in this case." In another instance, while supervising a law student intern
representing a defender client, a judge responded to the student's jury trial demand with a
phone call to inform me that, if we proceeded with the jury demand, the price would be that he
would require me, rather than the student, to try the case. See infra note 260 (discussing student
Michael DeFibaugh's account ofjury trial rights in a municipal court).
22 7This norm is explored in more detail below. See infra Part III.C.3.
23 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985) (defining a due process right for indigent defendants to expert
assistance for issues that are "significant factors" in a criminal trial).
24 See, e.g., Elmore v. State, 968 S.W.2d 462 (Tex. App. 1998). This example is based on
my own experience as a public defender.
25 As discussed below, judges have other sanctions available as well, such as discretion in
appointing counsel to criminal cases. See infra note 41 and accompanying text. Also, note that
a prosecutor could seek to enforce the same norm by recommending a higher-than-normal
sentence. Cf NARDULLI ET AL., supra note 15, at 151 (describing public defenders who
routinely waive an entitlement for a physician examination in a mental competency hearing).
26 Another example I observed in one locality is a norm against Sixth Amendment
challenges to jury venires. A group of public defenders noticed that the venires summoned for
jury duty were suddenly very unrepresentative (all senior citizens in one pool, all low income
African-Americans in another, nearly all affluent whites in a third, always from the same
neighborhoods). The motion was fully plausible on the doctrine, and the issue implicated an
important client as well as public interest in representative juries. Yet local judges reacted with
hostility, insisting the matter should be handled informally, although that would entail doing
several trials with unrepresentative juries. When the defenders declined to withdraw the
[Vol. 61:801
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Another well-documented norm conflicts with a seeming prerequisite of
zealous practice-filing defense discovery motions in criminal cases. In his
account of criminal practice in several Connecticut state court localities, Milton
Heumann notes widespread pressure on new attorneys not to file discovery
motions or bills of particulars, although new attorneys (trained in formal rules
from law school) are strongly inclined to do so. The norm in these court
communities, which experienced attorneys (particularly prosecutors) taught to
new attorneys with a combination of rewards and sanctions, was for the
prosecutor to employ an "open file policy" for defense attorneys who declined to
file discovery motions. New attorneys who filed motions faced a variety of
punishments, from warnings to withdrawal of "open files," stingy plea bargain
offers, and court date scheduling inconveniences. 27
Local practice communities often have many such norms. Judges may
discourage formal hearings on the record.28 Certain evidence rules may be so
consistently ignored that attorneys give up attempting to enforce the rules with
objections, so as to avoid judicial disapproval.29 Randall Kennedy has noted an
challenge, some judges resorted to classic norm sanctions: they verbally warned defenders of
negative implications ("You've mined your reputation in this courthouse."), and then imposed
docket changes to create scheduling conflicts and other burdens. Judges complained of one
attorney to the state bar (without consequence) and led a successful effort to have the defenders
evicted from their courthouse office space. (It turned out that the county's computer system that
used to draw names from voter lists for jury duty had malfunctioned; it began to pull names
nonrandomly, all from the same zip code areas.) See Interviews with Lynn Koeller and Tim
Young, Public Defenders, in Montgomery County, Ohio (Spring 1997) ( served as a
consultant to the defender office in this jury litigation).
2 7 See HEUMANN, supra note 16, at 52-91.
2 8 See, e.g., In re Inquiry Concerning Judge Damran, 487 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1985); Gwartz
v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. App. 4th 480 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999). The appellate court in Gwartz
reprimanded "a handful of judges on the local superior court bench" who refused parties an
opportunity for oral argument on summary judgment motions despite what the appellate court
here descnbes as clear case law mandating oral argument. Id. at 481-82. The trial judges'
practice suggests a typical norm that undermines a formal rule to serve what the judges view as
efficiency, although it undercuts public and party interests in procedures that aid at least the
appearance of due process if not substantive outcomes.
29 As one such example from civil practice, Sarat and Felstiner report an attorney's view
that evidence rules barring testimony of a divorce party's alleged adultery in certain contexts
are uniformly ignored, so that attorneys learn to forgo objections to such testimony. See
AUSTIN SARAT & WLiAM L. F. FELsTnER DIVORCE LAWYERS AND THm CLENTS 96-97
(1995). This account includes no mention of sanctions or rewards to enforce the norm, so that it
may be more in the nature of a custom, which is widely followed but not enforced by
punishments. It is likely, however, that judges perpetuate this custom with at least mild
sanctions, such as expressions of annoyance at attorneys who should know the objection is
useless. Repeated refusal might bring harsher sanctions. See iL at 99 (reporting that one
attorney advised his client, "'you can really prejudice the judge against you by bringing up
20001
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historical example of another norm regulating zealous motions practice: social
and professional sanctions on white lawyers who challenged exclusion of black
jurors.30 Local attorneys and judges may have customs of ex parte discussions of
cases, an objection to which may meet a sanction of negative gossip or
diminished cooperation. In many local jurisdictions, rules on ex parte
communication 1 are honored only sporadically; it is not uncommon for
attorneys to discuss cases substantively with a judge in chambers without
opposing counsel being present 32 In one case study in which attorneys reported
such ex parte contacts to be routine, an attorney made the rare response of filing
a motion to disqualify the judge. He reported that he encountered "all kinds of
flack' and was "forced [by his boss], under the threat of firing [him], to send an
apology to the judge because [he] had acted, according to [the judge], in an
unprofessional manner."33 (Tellingly, the attorney was new to the locality.
Informal sanctions quickly taught the local norm.)34 The same norm apparently
exists in civil practice contexts in some localities 35 although not in others. 36
As the examples indicate, lawyers and judges enforce practice norms with
informal sanctions. As is typical in other settings, such as Robert C. Ellickson's
study of ranchers,3 7 sanctions typically begin with verbal warnings or negative
certain issues in a certain way"').
30 See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 174(1997).
31 See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr Canon 3B(7) (2000); see also Phoebe Carter,
Annotation, Disciplinary Action Against Judge for Engaging in Ex Parte Communication with
Attorney, Pary or Witness, 82 A.L.R.4th 567 (1990) (collecting rules and cases). The Code has
been adopted by many states. See, e.g., CONN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr 3(a)(4) (1998).
32 See, e.g., FLEMMING Er AL., supra note 16, at 32; In re Inquiry Concerning Judge
Damron, 487 So. 2d at 5 (depicting a trial judge arguing his ex parte contacts are justified
because "in a rural county... this type of conmnunication is common").
33 FLEmMING Er AL., supra note 16, at 156.
3 4 See id
35 See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 387, 390, 425, 427
(1982) (noting that federal judges' increasing managerial role has led them to hold separate
meetings with parties to encourage settlement and gain information through such contacts that
may affect their decisions).
My colleagues who practice in local courts through a law school legal clinic report
observing similar widespread, routine instances of ex parte contact between judges and
opposing attorneys in civil cases. Though they have at times joined those conversations,
without invitation, when they encountered them in progress (thereby eliminating their ex parte
nature), they report never raising formal complaints about them nor hearing of other attorneys
who have done so.
36 See, e.g., FLEMMING ET AL., supra note 16, at 113, 130 (noting a judge who bars ex
parte contacts in criminal cases).
37 See ELLICKSON, supra note 11, at 209-10.
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gossip and then may escalate to more serious punishments. 38 Attorneys and
judges have a wide variety of tools for punishing norm violations. Studies of
local courts and practice settings are rich with examples. Negative gossip is
invariably documented as a sanction,39 as is public chastisement 40 Judges may
have the power to withhold or increase court appointments of both criminal and
civil cases (such as guardianships). 41 Judges (and sometimes prosecutors) may
have the power to create scheduling inconveniences for an attorney's court
appearances. 42 Sanctions can also include adverse rulings, such as an increased
sentence for defendants who lose at trial after forgoing a plea offer or insisting on
Ake funds.
Attorneys also have means to employ sanctions against one another.
38 See, e g., HEUMANN, supra note 16, at 62 (noting prosecutors' use of multiple sanctions
against defense attorneys who file discovery motions, typically starting with an explanation of
the norm to .'steer [the new attorney] straight,' then escalating to 'hassling, ..... dragging the
case out over a long period of time, closing all files to the attorney, and even threatening to go
to trial on the case!); id at 63 (stating that a sanction may include a less favorable plea bargain
offer for the defendant); see also ELLICKSON, supra note 11, at 214-19 (stating that the first
remedial norm group members resort to is typically the weakest or least drastic--typically, it is
gossip or verbal warning); NARDULLI Er AL, supra note 15, at 127 (describing "cordiality
norms" that govern "the appropriate responses to those who violate norms," such as making
the client "suffer," withholding cooperation, curtailing court appointments, or trying to fire the
attorney). Similarly, a key procedural norm is a duty to transmit information to other members
that help minirnize internal disputing (typically, one assumes, information about the content of
substantive norms). See hL at 230. Attorneys and judges typically transmit such information
and warnings especially to new attorneys (or to newly deviant attorneys).
39 References to gossip and widespread information exchange are pervasive in the
empirical literature. See, e.g., FLEMM]NG Er AL., supra note 16, at 10; HEUMANN, supra note
16; NARDULLI ETAL, supra note 15.
40 See FLEMMING ET AL., supra note 16, at 28, 55-56.
41 See id( at 125-26, 138 (finding that in one jurisdiction 'judges doled out masters and
guardianships"); id at 150 (expressing ajudge's statement: "[i]f you go to trial on every single
case, you're not gonna get the appointments"); id at 151 (describing judges who barred the
renewal of an indigent defense contract to a group of attorneys whose litigation seemed
excessive); Alison Frankel, Too Independent, AM. LAW., Jan.-Feb. 1993, 67, at 68 (discussing
proposals to remove judges' power to appoint federal public defenders to reduce judges' power
to retaliate for aggressive advocacy); see also Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S.
617, 647 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (describing zealous attorneys who may "displease a
judge' and "influence the judge's appointment decisions"); SARAT & FELsTnqER, supra note
29, at 106 (showing an attorney informing a client that because 'thejudge has been appointing
me on all the guardianship and guardian ad litem cases... maybe that is a sign that he likes
me... [and] inclined your way anyway").
4 2 See FLEMMNG Er AL, supra note 16, at 33-34 (criminal); id. at 69-70 (civil dockets);
HEUMANN, supra note 16, at 52-91; PEr F. NARDULLI, THE COURTRooM ELITE 153-61,
181-85 (1978).
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Prosecutors can withhold favorable plea bargain terms from uncooperative
defense counsel and discretionary favors such as open file discovery.43 Civil
attorneys can be similarly uncooperative in discovery and settlement
proceedings. Criminal defense attorneys typically have the fewest sanctions in
their arsenal but may nonetheless be capable of exercising rights to transfer a
case to another judge or of responding with refusals to stipulate to evidence or to
waive procedural entitlements. 44 Superiors can give office subordinates
unappealing case assignments. 45 Less obviously, judges sometimes have means
to make fellow judges observe norms; for example, managing judges control
other judges' dockets and work conditions.4 6
The sanction of negative gossip and verbal reprimand is potent in close-knit
law practice settings, because attorneys place considerable importance on their
reputations. 47 Reputation and credibility are a form of social capital that can
make a substantial difference to the attorney's material well-being. Poor
reputation may invite informal sanctions such as reduced court appointments and
private referrals.48 Further, it can make the attorney less effective for clients,
because it may reduce her ability to work with opposing counsel and judges who
expect norm compliance. Reputation, then, is a powerful mechanism for
influencing cooperative behavior 49 and, along with other, informal enforcement
43 See generally State v. LaForest, 665 A.2d 1083 (N.H. 1995). The LaForest court held
that it is not a due process violation for a prosecutor to condition a plea bargain offer on the
condition that the defendant not undertake further discovery. See id. at 1087. The prosecutor's
practice reveals the sort of informal sanctions (made available by doctrines like this due process
rule) that prosecutors can use to enforce norms against exercising formal entitlements. In this
rape case, the prosecutor had turned over a large amount of evidence but conditioned the offer
upon the defendant not seeking the results of a "rape kit" medical exam or deposing witnesses,
both of which were important to defendant's defense of absence of penetration. See id. at
1086-87.
44 See RFLENG Er AL., supra note 16, at 73; EDWARD HUMEs, No MATrER How LOUD
I SHOUT 285-92 (1996). Of course, use of such sanctions may carry a risk that they will be
countered with more severe responses.
4 5 See FLEMMNG ETAL., supra note 16, at 49, 56-57.
46 See LAwRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 35 (1997).
4 7 See FLEMMING ET AL.,supra note 16, at 65-66, 89, 139-44.
48 See Donald D. Landon, Clients, Colleagues, and Community: The Shaping of Zealous
Advocacy in Country Law Practice, 1985 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 81, 99 ("Business getting
involves meticulous ... maintenance of reputation .... Although the norms guiding the
evaluation are local, and not necessarily professional, the accountability is thorough and
effective:). "[The smaller community, with its more intense scrutiny and discussion of its
members' conduct and its greater ability to mobilize consensus ... (including clients and
cases), becomes a formidable source of sanctioning." Id. at 111; Ribstein, supra note 8, at
1714-15.
4 9 See ELLicKsON, supra note 11, at 232.
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tools, for forcing attorneys to take account of norms.
B. Functions of Practice Norms
1. Self-Interest and Efficiency Rationales
Scholars have offered several theories of the origin of norms 50 In his
influential book, Order Without Law, Ellickson defends a central hypothesis
about the function of norms. "[Miembers of a close-knit group develop and
maintain norms whose content serves to maximize the aggregate welfare that
members obtain in their workaday affairs with one another."51 Norms encourage
cooperation among group members who have the option of adversarial or other
noncooperative conduct, especially in non-zero-sum contexts in which
cooperation will yield mutual gains. Groups use norms to set a standard of
ordinary or expected behavior.52 Just as ranchers or orchard owners 53 can be
deemed a "bad neighbor" subject to sanctions, an attorney who creates excessive
work and disruption deemed unnecessary may face sanctions. 54 Generally, then,
economic and public choice approaches suggest that norms facilitate cooperation
among group members and diminish deadweight losses to the group's
objectively measured aggregate welfare.55 Norms often establish infornal social
contracts to solve collection action problems and to supply collective goods.56
Participants often perceive norms as products of necessity.57 Attorneys and
50 See McAdams, supra note 14, at 339-54.
51 ELUCKSON, supra note 11, at 167.
52 Ellickson's thesis accords with empirical studies of courts that stress the use of norms
to serve self-interest. See, eg., NARDULU ET AL., supra note 15, at 377 (concluding from an
extensive study of state criminal courts that norms will endure and "act as check upon
individual actors" as long as they "serve[ ] the interests and needs of the courtroom actors').
53 See Steven N. S. Cheung, The Fable of the Bees: An Economic Investigation, 16 J.L. &
ECON. 11, 29-30 (1973) (considering the custom ofbeekeeping by rural orchard owners).
54 See, eg., HEUMANN, supra note 16, at 61 (noting prosecutors resented standard
discovery motions by defense attorneys as "an unwarranted waste of time'). Of course,
ranchers and orchard owners are principals, while attorneys are agents. See infra Part V.D.I.
55 See ELLICKSON, supra note 11, at 172, 241. Note that this is objectively measured
welfare. The inadequacy of objective measurements are well known. See, e.g., Richard H.
Pildes, The Unintended Cultural Consequences of Public Policy: A Comment on the
Symposium, 89 MICH. L. REv. 936, 937, 955-66 (1991) (presenting a problem especially
relevant for attorney-client contexts, which is addressed below); see also infra Part IVA.
56 For a discussion of how the social meaning of norms solves collective action problems,
see Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 956-58
(1995).
57See Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, Introduction to TBE NEW
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judges in some settings are so pressed by scarce resources that they cannot fllly
utilize costly entitlements.58 In litigation settings, practice norms typically help
conserve court and attorney (and sometimes, client) resources by forgoing claims
and procedures for which there are cheaper, informal substitutes. Examples may
include prosecutor open file policies instead of discovery motions; ex parte or
informal negotiations with judges instead of motions practice;59 and pleas
instead ofjury trials. Because formality is usually more costly than informality, 60
norms help avoid procedures not perceived as cost-justified by the professional
community, such as appeals of adverse rulings in minor misdemeanor cases.61
Practice norms, however, are often problematic as efficient substitutes for
formal legal and professional rules, partly for reasons public choice scholars
recognize. First, unlike many settings that have been the focus of norms studies,
legal practice involves an agency relationship, and norms developed by lawyers
and judges sometimes impose agency costs on clients. Attorneys and judges may
have strong incentives to minimize use of formal procedures and entitlements if
informal processes save them resources, and parties cannot assess what benefits
they lose from forgoing formality.62 In the jargon of public choice theory,
practice norms sometimes are rent seeking.63 Further, the utility variables used to
INSTITrrIONAuISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYsIS 10-28 (Walter W. Powell & Paul J.
DiMaggio eds.) (1991) (discussing how human behavior in institutional settings is constrained
and influenced by conventions that shape preferences and make some options appear necessary
when they are in fact optional).
58 The same justification has been offered for ADR. See Judith Resnik, Many Doors?
Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OHIo ST. J. ON DIsP.
REsOL. 211,246 (1995); Stuntz, supra note 6, at 32-37.
59 See, e.g., In re Inquiry Concerning Judge Damron, 487 So. 2d 1, 5 (Fla. 1985)
(describing a trial judge who argued, in a disciplinary proceeding, that his ex parte contact with
counsel was justified by the '"heavy county court dockee' and because "this type of
communication is common"); see also supra note 26 (discussing Ohio trial judges' pressure on
public defenders to forgo constitutional challenge to unrepresentative jury pools).
60 This does not mean formality is not cost-justified, but that calculus may depend on
valuing subjective benefits and utilities, which cannot be done objectively. See infra notes
158-59.
61 See FLEMMqNG ETAL., supra note 16, at 150-51.
62 Risks for clients arise in the determination that informal arrangements fully substitute
for formal processes and do not discount client values or impose other externalities on clients.
Even if an attorney informs a client of the likely sanction for violating a norm-insisting on a
trial in the face of a possible trial penalty--the norm still burdens the client's decision whether
to exercise the entitlement Further, attomeys make many norm-based decisions without
consulting the client.
63 Cf. David Chamy, Illusions of a Spontaneous Order: "Norms" in Contractual
Relationships, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1841, 1848, 1851 (1996) (discussing contexts in which,
under public choice theory premises, some groups seem likely to create inefficient norms that
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assess efficiency here are especially "sof and difficult to quantify. They include
clients' nonmonetary preferences and public values implicated in public
adjudication64 (both of which are addressed in more detail below).
Second, legal pluralism belies an explanation of norms that relies solely on
resource constraints and professionals' self-interest Within comparable practice
settings-such as local criminal courts with roughly comparable dockets,
budgets, and staffing-there exists wide variation in practice norms. Some
locales have more formal discovery, more trials, and stronger traditions of
aggressive advocacy. Such pluralism (and thus, practice norms) is more fully
explained by reference to informal justice commitments and the ideological
function of norms. Finally, norms studies in the legal literature rarely deal with
actors who are governed by formal ethical codes, and public choice theory does
not have good tools to explain how actors reconcile self-interested action with
professionalism commitments. 65 Norms revise the professional rules themselves,
which presents normative rather than efficiency issues.66
2. Norms as Justice Standards
Practice norms serve a second function that helps justify their content and
reconcile their apparent conflict with professionalism rules. Norms serve
practitioners' conceptions of substantive justice and procedural fairness,
including views about which entitlements clients really deserve, even if those
views contradict formal rules.
Psychological research has found that fairness concerns have an effect in
explaining behavior and attitudes toward courts and public institutions
favor concentrated, interested groups over diffuse ones).
64 Law has normative goals-equality, corrective justice, individual rights, procedural
fairness-independent of efficiency. See ELLICKSON, supra note 11, at 206; id. at 169-70
(citing Jim Crow segregation as one example of a norms regime that benefitted insiders at a
substantial cost to those outside the group). Assessments of efficiency are thus problematic,
because the assessment requires identifying what case outcomes law seeks to produce
efficiently, and that requires a qualitative judgment See Resnik, supra note 35, at 395,420-21;
Resnik, supra note 58, at 225-28.
The same problem affects cost-benefit analysis more broadly in regulatory policymaking.
See Pildes, supra note 55, at 955-56 (discussing understatement of "soff' variables in
policymaking). For an influential argument on the public values at stake in adjudication over
private settlement, see Owen Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE W. 1073, 1085-87
(1984).
65 See Karlan, supra note 8, at 1766-67.
66 Cf. NARDULLI Er AL, supra note 15, at 126 (describing variation in criminal court
communities, with some emphasizing efficiency and others seeking goals of disinterested
professionalism).
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independently of self-interest motivations. 67 Once professionals arrive at a
consensus on which rights litigants are really entitled to, or what conduct is
really professional, practice norms incorporate those justice notions and in turn
are justified by them. Because a norm seems fair and right, its conflict with a
formal rule is less objectionable.68 This accords with the more general
conclusion that people feel a moral obligation to obey norms because they
internalize the moral content of the norm.69 Norms provide the functional
content of professionalism as well as legal rules. Norms in this sense "subsidize"
breaches of formal ethical or legal rules; they make it easier to do so by
substituting professional-group approval for what otherwise should be
dissonance between the norm's content and professional or legal rules7
For a vivid example, recall the attorney who raised a complaint about ex
parte contacts.71 His objection was deemed "unprofessional." Not only is
complicity in ex parte contacts considered consistent with professionalism,
refusal to comply is labeled unprofessional. The working conception of
professionalism is fully reversed from the formal standard and vigorously
enforced without the slightest cognitive dissonance.
Two related lines of empirical literature support the idea that justice
sentiments underlie norms. First, the recent literature on commonsense justice,
which focuses on criminal law, suggests that, on a range of substantive law
issues, popular sentiments differ from criminal codes and doctrine. Many people
67 See Tom p. Tyler et al., Alternative Images of the Citizen: Implications for Public
Policy, 41 AM. PSYCHOLOGisT 970, 973 (1986).
68 This point is relevant to the argument over whether norms are efficient. If professionals
value procedural entitlements for elite litigants more than those for low income litigants, norms
that displace those entitlements are less likely to seem cost-effective. This hypothesis may
suggest an avenue for refining much of empirical findings on procedural justice, which
suggests that elites place more emphasis on procedural justice than average citizens. See Robert
J. Boeckmann & Tom R. Tyler, Commonsense Justice and Inclusion Within the Moral
Community: When Do People Receive Procedural Protections from Others?, 3 PsYCHOL.,
PUB. POL'Y& L. 362,376 (1997). Observations of law practice suggest that legal professionals
employ some of the same distinctions, or at least that one finds such attitudes in the less elite
sectors of the bar-those attorneys and judges who work in local courts with large numbers of
low income parties.
69 See Robert D. Cooter, Against Legal Centrism, 81 CAL. L. REV. 417, 426-27 (1993)
(reviewing ELLICKSON, supra note 11). For an example, see HEUMANN, supra note 16, at 86
(describing an attorney's accommodation to a trial penalty norm by his stating, "I think
substantial justice is worked out a good percentage of the time; you kind of reach the right
results for the wrong reasons.").
7 0 See Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 934,
940 (1996) (discussing how norms may "tax[ ]" or "subsidiz[e]" choices).
71 See FLEMMIrG Er AL., supra note 16, at 156 (discussed supra at notes 32-34 and
accompanying text).
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think, for example, that accomplices should be punished less harshly than
principal perpetrators, especially in felony murder crimes. At least in mock jury
studies, those sentiments affect verdicts despite contrary legal rules.72 Other
studies recount examples of legal professionals allowing popular sentiments to
inform discretionary judgments. Traffic court judges sometimes fashion a rough
justice by dismissing tickets of undisputed violators because the burden of
having to come to court is deemed sufficient punishment.73 Trial judges have
actively subverted civil rights and criminal procedure entitlements created by
Supreme Court decisions. 74
Second, extensive research on procedural justice suggests that perceptions of
procedural fairness have significant effects, independent of substantive
outcomes, on how one assesses legitimacy of courts and decisionmakers.75
Commitments to fair procedures vary with the context and the claim or rights at
issue.76 In the criminal context, support for jury trials and complex
7 2 See NORMAN J. FINKEL, COMMONSENSE JUSTICE: JURORS' NOTIONs OF THE LAW 159-
71 (1995) (drawing conclusions from mock juror studies); see also Paul H. Robinson & John
M. Darley, JUsnCE, LIABILITY AND BLAME: COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRmIINAL LAW 13-
51 (1995); c. CAss R. SUNSTEIN Er AL., Do PEOPLE WANT O MAL DEERRENCE? (University
of Chicago Law School John M. Olin Program in Law & Economics Working Papers No. 77,
2d Sers., 1999) (stating that strongly held moral intuitions may undercut opposing legal rules or
policies) (available electronically at <http:/Jwww.law.uchicago.edu/Publications/Working/
ndex.html> (visited May 11, 2000).
73 While that rough justice stikes judges as substantively fair, it bothers many litigants as
procedurally unfair. See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PsYCHOLOGY OF
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 2 (1988). As further examples, note that some state trial judges openly
concede their choice to inform their judgments, at least where law is ambiguous, with
community values or popular local sentiment, including endorsement of plea bargains that treat
accomplices less severely than principals. See generally ROBERT A. CARP & C.K. ROWLAND,
POLICYMAKNG AND POLITcs IN THE FEDERAL DISTRIcr COURTS (1983) (finding, based on
empirical research, that judicial attitudes-including personal values and regional customs-
influence judges' decisions); FLEMMING Er AL., supra note 16, at 125 (showing a judge
chastising a prosecutor for refusing to treat an armed robbery defendant less severely than the
principal perpetrator "even though the individual in this case was just a tagalong!); Lief H.
Carter, How Trial Judges Talk: Speculations About Foundationalism and Pragmatism in Legal
Culture, in LEGAL HERMENEtMCS: HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTICE 219, 228 (Gregory Leyh
ed. 1992). Prosecutors divert their limited resources away from enforcement of laws that seem
antiquated and of little social value. Cf William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering,
101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1091 (1988) (describing how prosecutors and other legal actors, in
addition to juries, effectively nullify applications of certain laws).
74 See, e.g., GERALD N. ROsENBERG, THE HOLLOw HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? 89 (1991).
7 5 See Tyler et al., supra note 67, at 975.
76 See Boeekmnn & Tyler, supra note 68, at 363.
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decisionmaking procedures increases with the severity of the crime.7 7 Support
for fair procedures also varies with the type of crime and with instrumental
concerns, such as the perceived threat a suspect poses. 8 People also discriminate
in their attitudes toward procedural fairness based on symbolic or relational
concerns, meaning that those who are outside one's social group or seemingly
pose a threat to shared community values are viewed as deserving less
procedural fairness than those closer to one's group or values.79
Practice norms reflect the same procedural justice attitudes. 80 Most of the
norms at issue here involve procedural protections. Trials, funds for experts,
limits on ex parte contact, and formal discovery are processes designed to
improve substantive outcomes by increasing information, reducing bias, or
opening the process to public scrutiny. Following this research, one would expect
lawyers and judges to honor formal entitlements to jury trials or expert assistance
more in murder trials than misdemeanors but less when the accused is poor or
otherwise from a marginal community (when the "social distance" between
lawyer and litigant is greater).81 Furthermore, it is apparent that lawyers feel
77 See id. at 364.
7 8 See id at 363-64.
79 See id at 363-65,367,372,377.
80 Arguably, many criminal courts expend more resources for procedure in capital
cases-more readily funding experts, for example, or tolerating extensive pretrial motion
practice. The horror stories of inadequate capital defense counsel and inadequate funding of
defense, however, demonstrate that the claim at best applies unevenly across jurisdictions. See
Steven Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the
Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1837-44 (1994); Cf HERBERT MCCLOSKY & ALDA
BRnLL DIMENSIONS OF TOLERANCE: WHAT AMERICANS BELEVE ABOUr CivWL LIBERTIES 136-
70, 232-73 (1983) (finding that political and legal "elites" place greater emphasis on civil
rights and due process than others).
For suggestions that state and local judges are relatively responsive to popular sentiment,
see, for example, Carter, supra note 73, at 228 (concluding from discussions with state trial
judges that "[w]hen confronted with an ambiguity in law, these judges imagined themselves
both capable and empowered to resolve the ambiguity... by opting for that choice which
better fit their vision of community values and experiencese); Steven P. Croley, The
Majoritarian Difficul4: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CM. L. REV. 689, 727
(1995). Carter recounts one judge's statements as representative:
[M]ost of the time you reach a result that's fair and then build your thinking around
it... We disregard precedents, but we sure try to avoid reversals.... Where are cases
where I say to myself, 'Well, the precedent is on all fours, but I think it's wrong, and those
guys [on the state supreme court] are over in [the capital], and by God, I'm deciding this
case.'
Carter, supra note 73, at 232.
8 1 See DONALD BLACK, SOCiLOIiCAL JuSTICE 8-18 (1989) (concluding from a survey
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sufficiently free from rules to make those distinctions. Ethnographic studies of
practicing lawyers find that attorneys rarely "[feel] constrained by rules,
regulations, and procedures"8 2 and "generally disparage[ ] ... the rationality,
importance, or efficacy of legal rules. '83 Local judges sometimes distrust
supreme court rulings due to the justices' distance from daily trial practice.84 The
procedural entitlements that norms supplant can seem excessive or superfluous
in real-world trial settings. The norms themselves may seem legitimate precisely
because they are revised by ground-level experience and are devised by
professionals who naturally trust their own commitments to fairness.
HI. UNPACKING NORMS
Some norms are fully in control of local practice groups (whose members, in
turn, are restrained by them). More interestingly, other norms are responses to
broad, systemic tensions that make the entitlement undermined by the norm
impractical. The nature of norms can reveal whether local practice groups are the
of empirical research that law plays a lesser role among "social equals" than among socially
disparate parties). The thesis accords with psychological research finding that ordinary citizens
place great emphasis on the fairness of procedures in the absence of objective bases for judging
the fairness of outcomes. See TOMR. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 109 (1990).
These fairness commitments help explain why lawyers less often choose to adopt norms
than to ill-serve the interests of wealthy clients; norms there would seem less fair. See JOHN P.
HEINZ & EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCIURE OF THE BAR
140 (1982) (discussing findings that 'lawyers' values will be influenced by ... client[]
interests"); Robert L. Nelson, Ideology, Practice, and Professional Autonomy: Social Values
and Client Relationships in the Large Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 503, 511-28 (1985)
(finding corporate lawyers' personal views converge over time with their clients' interests and
values). Compare EVE SPANGLER, LAWYERS FOR HIRE: SALARIED PROFESSIONALS AT WORK
58 (1986) (reporting a corporate lawyer's fondness for his clients) with NARDULU ET AL., supra
note 15, at 145 (documenting one jurisdiction with an "exceptionally conservative [criminal]
defense bar," represented by one attorney who said, "I don't really identify with my criminal
clients .... I'm not from that level of society.").
82 Carrie Menkel-Meadow & Robert G. Meadow, Resource Allocation in Legal Services:
Individual Attorney Decisions in WorkPriorities, 5 LAw & POL'Y Q. 237,250 (1983) (basing
its findings on interviews of attorneys).
83 SARAT & FELS NR supra note 29, at 96. Those findings stand in contrast to the
assumption that lawyers largely legitimate prevailing arrangements in the legal system with
uncritical views of its operation. See id at 86. Nelson and Trubek's work suggests this
conclusion is equally or more tre for ethical rules. See Nelson & Trubek, supra note 7, at 213;
see also infra Part V.D.2 (discussing Nelson & Trubek's work).
84 See, e.g., Carter, supra note 73, at 232 (recording as representative one state trial
judge's statement, "[t]here are cases where I say to myself, 'Well, the precedent is on all fours,
but I think it's wrong, and those guys [the supreme court] are over in [the capital], and by God,
I'm deciding this case.").
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source for change of dysfictional norms, or whether norms are a sign that some
rules are infeasible in the larger justice system and need to be revised. In the
latter case, norms point the way to revising formal rules. What follows is a
survey of several norms that illustrate the various types and causes of practice
norms, yielding a taxonomy of norm types.
A. Discovery Norms
Consider again the norm against discovery motions and bills of particulars.85
Discovery practice was at issue in the Supreme Court's decision in Striclder v.
Greene,86 a capital case in which the defense attorney relied on the prosecution's
open file policy in lieu of filing a discovery motion. A norm against discovery
motions presents a problematic strategic choice for defense attorneys. If they
forgo motions and comply with the norm, they may gain informal advantages for
clients, such as fuller discovery of inculpatory evidence (to which there is no
constitutional right) and an amicable working relationship that yields benefits
like better plea bargain offers or time savings.87 In doing so, however, they may
also sacrifice legal rights and strategic advantages for clients.
Without a discovery motion, defendants may have waived rights to object to
discovery withheld by prosecutors, particularly items to which they have only a
statutory, rather than constitutional, right 88 Moreover, failure to request
discovery formally can affect even evidence prosecutors are required to disclose
under Brady v. Maryland.89 A specific request can affect the assessment of
whether undisclosed evidence is "material" and whether a Brady violation
occurred. Under an earlier standard set out in United States v. Agurs,90
materiality was assessed under a two-tiered framework, so that nondisclosures of
8 5 See supra text accompanying note 27.
86 527 U.S. 263 (1999). It should be noted that it is unclear whether the practice in
Strickler was a norm (enforced by sanctions), a mere custom (for which the defense would
have faced no penalty for filing a motion), or mere laziness.
87 Improved plea bargains as a result of cooperation must be weighed against the
improved bargaining position one can achieve by demonstrating zealous preparation and
obtaining discovery that might not otherwise become a factor in negotiations or trial.
88 Many state criminal discovery rules give defendants much broader discovery rights
than the Constitution requires. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.1 (West Supp. 2000); ILL. S.
Cr. R. 412; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.20 (McKinney 1999); OHIO R. CIM. P. 16.
89 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1963) (describing a due process obligation to reveal exculpatory
evidence even without a defense request). But see Strickler v. Pruett, 149 F.3d 1170 (4th Cir.
1998), rev'd, Strickler v. Greene, 119 S. Ct. 1936 (1999) (requiring defense attorney, in order
to avoid procedural default, to use "reasonable diligence" to discover Brady material); Stockton
v. Murray, 41 F.3d 920,925 (4th Cir. 1994) (same).
90 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
[Vol. 61:801
0LA WYERING NORMS
evidence that were specifically requested by the defense were treated more
favorably to defendants than evidence for which there was no request or only a
general, boilerplate request.91 The Supreme Court replaced that two-tiered
structure in United States v. Bagley92 with a single standard, which defines
evidence as material if there is a "reasonable probability" it would have affected
the trial outcome. Nonetheless, the Court described the new approach as
"sufficiently flexible" to distinguish between specific-request and no-request or
general-request casesY3
Thus, even under Bagley, defendants lose a strategic advantage on Brady
material by not filing specific discovery motions. Moreover, a significant
minority of state supreme courts continue to employ an Agurs-style two-tiered
approach under state law to ensure further protection for defendants filing
specific requests.94 To the extent a norm encourages reliance on open file
policies in lieu of discovery motions, it even jeopardizes a defendant's right
(more specifically, her posttrial remedy) to evidence a prosecutor is required to
disclose with such a motion.
The no-discovery-motions norm means attorneys can preserve those rights
only at a cost Norms designed to increase the efficiency of criminal litigation
and save attorney and court resources undermine legal entitlements in a way that
increases the risks (that is, of wrongly withheld discovery) against which the
entitlement guards. It can also add a marginal incentive for abuse and decrease
the checks on discovery violations;95 prosecutors can gamble that evidence they
9 1 See id. at 111-12. Evidence specifically requested by the defense was deemed material
if it "might have affected the outcome of the trial," while evidence for which there was only a
general request or none at all was deemed material only if it "create[d] a reasonable doubt
[about defendant's guilt] that did not otherwise exist." Id. at 104, 112.
92 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
93 See id at 682--84 (reasoning in part that nondisclosure after a specific request not only
deprives the defendant of evidence but also misleads him into thinking the evidence does not
exist and therefore into abandoning investigative and trial efforts in that direction).
94 See, eg., Roberts v. State, 881 P.2d 1, 7-8 (Nev. 1994); State v. Marshall, 586 A.2d
85, 91-92 (NJ. 1991); People v. Vilardi, 555 N.E.2d 915,920 (N.Y. 1990); Commonwealth v.
Gallarelli, 502 N.EB2d 516, 519 n.5 (Mass. 1987).
95 That is, a prosecutor who knows that the practice norn requires forfeiture of claims
about discovery violations may try to take advantage of that forfeiture. That incentive likely is
supported by a justice rationale: a prosecutor who feels sure a defendant is guilty may be more
likely to withhold exculpatory evidence and view the choice as one that serves the correct final
outcome. Cf. Resnik, supra note 35, at 413-14 (noting a similar problem with managerial
judging in discovery contexts, in which judges "are restrained only by personal beliefs about
[their] proper role" and some of their actions are "invisible[ ] and unreviewable"); Stephen .
Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion as a Regulatory System, 17 L LEGAL STUD. 43, 78-79
(1988) (noting that even in the best jurisdictions, criminal defense attorneys get only a fraction
of the information through discovery that civil litigants routinely receive).
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withhold will be deemed after trial insufficient to "undermine confidence in the
outcome."
The norm against formal discovery, like many others, also has subtle effects
on the quality of routine practice.96 A key distinction between exceptional and
mediocre lawyering is that an attorney works hard and imaginatively even with
"ordinary" cases in search of winning (perhaps unusual) strategies.97 Zealous
discovery practice holds prosecutors and courts to disclosure obligations that
may go unfulfilled otherwise; it challenges customs of minimal discovery
practice that are facilitated by trial court practices of using standing discovery
orders for all cases and by lax appellate review standards that reduce
prosecutors' risks of insufficient disclosure.98 Bill Geirer has argued that
zealous discovery practice can help expand the working definition of the kinds of
evidence covered by the Brady obligation.99 Moreover, careful discovery
practice takes advantage of the gap between the disclosure obligation and the
appellate review standard-Brady material might be useful to the defense
96 Note how such a norm can interplay with well-documented concern of attorneys for
their reputations. Attorneys build reputations in part by displaying good judgment in motions
practice. See FLEMING ETAL., supra note 16, at 164. Attorneys noted that those who filejunk
motions get all their motions dismissed; those who file only a few, good motions get them
taken seriously. See id. at 168-71. Learning the guidelines set by this norm enhances their
reputation (which may redound to the client's benefit). See id. If the attorney is known for good
judgment, those motions she does file will be given more careful consideration. See ia at 164-
70. Moreover, reputation becomes part of the information other players use to assess the merits
of motions. See id. at 170-71. Without full knowledge of facts, which may require a hearing,
and perhaps without thorough review of the law (depending on how well the judge or district
attorney knows the law at issue), the assessment of a motion often is made on imperfect
information. How imperfect it will be may vary; a prosecutor, for instance, may have
considerable factual information available from her own file.
97 See Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, Can a Reasonable Doubt Have a Reasonable
Price? Limitations on Attorneys' Fees in Criminal Cases, 41 B.C. L. REV. (forthconing Dec.
1999) at 49, n.155 & 59-60 (manuscript) (arguing "routine loser" cases can be won by zealous,
imaginative advocates who do not treat them routinely, and noting that "[m]any United States
Supreme Court cases have involved 'routine' misdemeanor convictions" (citing cases)).
98 Ibis describes the case law of the Fourth Circuit now at least partially overturned by
Strickler. See Strickler v. Pruett, 149 F.3d 1170 (4th Cir. 1998), rev'd, Strickler v. Greene, 119
S. Ct. 1936 (1999) (requiring defense attorney, in order to avoid procedural default of claim, to
use "reasonable diligence" to discover Brady material that the state is constitutionally required
to reveal); Stockton v. Murray, 41 F.3d 920, 925 (4th Cir. 1994) (same). My colleague Bill
Geimer makes this point in CLE programs to criminal defense attorneys, particularly with
respect to capital litigation. See William S. Geimer, Pretrial Kyles at 7-8 (Fall 1998)
(unpublished manuscript for CLE program, on file with author). Professor Geimer also
emphasized trial court use of standard-form discovery orders.
99 Cf Geimer, supra note 98. Of course, there are time and resource costs to zealous
practice, which partly explains some of the failure, though probably only part.
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pretrial but be deemed on appeal not to have been likely to alter the trial's
outcomeI00-- to force the disclosure of evidence when it is useful rather than
merely to preserve an issue for appeal.' 01
Recognizing a discovery-norm effect argues for several responses from
Brady doctrine. The case law already includes the first-a reliance doctrine that
recognizes that defendants forgo discovery motions to take advantage of open
file policies. Recognizing such reliance, as the Court did in Striclder, prevents a
finding of procedural default 10 2 Additionally, the effects of norms call for a
reassessment of related rules, such as one allowing prosecutors to condition plea
bargain offers on the defense not pursuing discovery. 103 Doctrines balance many
competing concerns, and the final calculus may still support such a rule, but
norms reveal its cost to be higher: the rule creates a means to enforce an
undesirable norm. The norm also argues for a more stringent standard of view
for Brady claims to minimize the dangers noted above-lax review of no-request
Brady claims. Strickler can be read as a move in this direction. It signals to
jurisdictions such as the Fourth Circuit that lower courts should not weaken
Brady, particularly by findings of default arising from failures to file discovery
motions. Finally, jurisdictions could encourage the use of formal motions-
reducing the costs of forgoing them noted above-by minimizing prosecutors'
obligations to respond to them with formal writings. If prosecutors can answer
such motions with open file policies rather than with written responses, they have
much less incentive to discourage such motions.104
Discovery, then, is an example of a practice area in which formal rules have
100 This was exactly the outcome in Strickler. Strickler, 119 S. Ct. at 1948.
101 See Geimer, supra note 98, at 2-3. Similarly, bills require prosecutors to specify
grounds for criminal charges. They provide some limit on the way the state may prove
allegations in court, see, e.g., OHIO R. CRIM. PRO. 7(e) (allowing an amendment of the
indictment anytime before trial within the judge's discretion as 'Justice requires"); counter the
practice of vague indictments that include little more than statutory elements; provide some
information on the prosecution's case theory, and focus the defense attorney's investigation
and case preparation. Employed as part of standard practice, bills should have a subtle but, over
time, real effect of raising the quality of practice on both sides. A norm for a bill of
particulars-or detailed discovery-should eventually become part of the baseline minimum of
activities around which court budgets, attorney staffing levels, and individual lawyer time
management are set.
102 The Supreme Court in Stric/der built on existing doctrine and uncontroversially
accepted that the defendant had relied on the prosecutor's open file policy in his decision not to
file discovery motions. See Strickler, 119 S. Ct. at 1949.
103 See generally State v. LaForest, 665 A.2d 1083 (N.H. 1995) (holding that it is not a
due process violation for a prosecutor to condition a plea bargain offer on defendant's
agreement not to pursue further discovery, including the results of a "rape kit" medical exam in
arape case).
104 See HEUMANN, supra note 16, at 61-69, 107.
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in part accommodated the norm, and in other respects could easily adapt to both
discourage the norm and to reduce its undesirable consequences. Such
accommodation serves the underlying policy goal of Brady and discovery
generally. Brady exists because trust of prosecutors to reveal exculpatory
evidence, even with clear ethical obligations,10 5 is an insufficient safeguard.
Norms ideally arise in contexts of trust and ongoing cooperation. To the extent a
norm is a mutually designed practice among equal opponents (rather than one
imposed by a powerful side, such as prosecutors), trust should minimize
abuse.106 Yet unequal influence between the opposing sides reduces confidence
that this discovery norm is an adequate substitute for legal rights. 10 7 Rule
changes can modestly discourage the norm and its attendant costs while also
capturing some of its benefits.
B. The Closing Argument-Objection Norm
Another rule that conflicts with a practice norm in some jurisdictions relates
to closing argument Often, case law requires that defense objections to improper
comments in the prosecution's closing argument must be made immediately at
the time of the comment, rather than at the end of the argument, to avoid waiver
of the objection.108 Yet in some jurisdictions, particularly rural ones (the sorts of
smaller communities in which norms readily arise), there exists a strong norm of
courtesy and collegiality that counsels against interrupting an adversary's closing
argument.109 (That norm accords with the strategic judgment of trial attorneys
105 See MODEL RULES OF PROFEsSIONAL CoNDUCr Rule 3.8(d) (1997); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSBILiTY DR 7-103(3) (1980).
10 6 In economic terms, group members cooperate to create a norm in order to reap a
collective good-time and effort savings from forgoing written motions, responses, and
hearing. That cooperation comes at a cost, particularly in this instance for defendants, who risk
losing appellate remedies. Failure to disclose evidence pursuant to the Brady obligation and the
norm that substitutes for a specific request rcresents a defection from the group's norm
agreement; the prosecutor reaps the collective good without paying a cost, i.e., fulfilling the
obligation to disclose. Occasions in which defection is more likely, especially when defection
cannot be easily monitored or punished, provide stronger basis for court intervention. See Eric
A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions on
CollectiveAction, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 133, 155-61 (1996).
10 7 For further discussion of agency problems, see infra Part V.D.l.
108 See Commonwealth v. Beavers, 427 SE.2d 411, 419 (Va. 1993); Commonwealth v.
Cheng, 393 S.E.2d 599, 605-06 (Va. 1990); see also Mack v. Commonwealth, 454 S.E.2d 750
(Va. App. 1995).
109 My colleague, Bill Geimer, a leading authority and practitioner in Virginia criminal
trial practice, regularly wams attorneys in CLE settings about the cost, in light of strict waiver
doctrine, of following "Virginia's long tradition of civility" by not objecting during an
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who disfavor making objections during closing for fear of alienating juries.) The
norm is interesting as a cultural modification of the adversary system; adherents
have little to gain beyond amicable work relations with repeat opponents or
judges and a corresponding courtesy during their own arguments. Yet their
clients may lose the entitlement barring prejudicial comments under a rule
requiring immediate objection.
Here again is a norm to which the formal rule could easily adapt. The
rationale for the rule rests largely on the need for the judge to be able to correct
improper statements with a jury instruction, rather than be left with only the
remedy of mistrial for objections raised after trial. Yet a modified rule allowing
counsel to make objections at the end of an opponent's argument still leaves time
to instruct the jury before it retires. (It also gives counsel a few moments to
formulate the bases for objections, which may not always come to mind at the
moment of the offending comment.) In addition to preserving courteous relations
among counsel and reducing interruptions during trial, such a rule reduces the
number of uncorrected rule violations. Beyond a defendant's personal interest,
the justice system itself values adjudications resolved without the taint of
prejudicial arguments. In those many jurisdictions that lack such a courtesy norm
and where zealous advocacy prevails, no rule change is needed; but, in areas
where the norm has proved resistant to the incentive effect of the rule, case law
can easily adapt to the practice in service of both the defendant's and the public's
interests.
C. Norms Regarding Trials and Expert-Witness Funds
In contrast to the preceding examples, two other widely observed norms
directly implicate the resources of the justice system as well as the work loads of
attorneys. Recall the example of the Ake motion for an expert witness in a
misdemeanor case. A utilitarian explanation of a practice norm discouraging
such motions emphasizes a judge's wish to conserve limited court funds by
discouraging requests for Ake funds. She may also want to conserve time and
effort by not hearing such motions, especially if, in the context of the case, their
value seems marginal (and they raise the odds of an appealable issue).110 Funds
opponent's argument, which he observes even in his area of special expertise, capital trials.
Interview with William S. Geimer, Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University (Spring
1999).
110 One judge, who chaired a committee appointed by Chief Justice Rehnquist to view
the process of appointing federal defenders, acknowledged the temptation ofjudges to retaliate
against lawyers who increase their work load with aggressive advocacy. Frankel, supra note
41, at 68. He argued for his committee's recommendation that judges have less control over
those appointments, which they can use to weed out aggressive defenders, by noting that
judges are tempted not to re-appoint a defender who is "really very aggressive, filing all the
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that the court dispenses come from a budget that judges do not control. Judges
are acutely aware of mismatches between the cost of entitlements created by
appellate decisions and legislative decisions to fund them. Just because a court
says a defendant is entitled to an expert does not mean the legislature has
allocated funds for every defendant. The expert-funds norm regulates those
limited resources.
The same is true with regard to jury trials. Several studies document a
widely held view among judges that some criminal cases are not "worthy" of
trial, that trial demands in certain cases are "unreasonable," independent of the
court's time constraints or docket baklog.1 II In Heumann's study, Connecticut
judges explicitly admitted use of a "trial penalty" for insisting on a trial (or other
use of court resources, such as motion hearings) viewed by judges and others as
unnecessary. The judges' comments document a substantive norm that redefines
the formal right to trial. A defendant "deserves to be penalized for the trial
because he takes up the court's time, there is expense involved, and so on....
He's got a right to try a case where he has got a reasonable position."' 1 2 A large
multistate study finds the same view elsewhere; 113 it is also documented in a
Florida trial Court. 114
The Supreme Court has read the Sixth Amendment to give a jury trial right
to every defendant, in state or federal court, facing the possibility of at least six
motions, making twice as much work for the judge." Id.
11 See FLEMMIiNG ET AL., supra note 16, at 56-75; HEUMANN, supra note 16, at 140-43.
The sanction also accords with my own perceptions in practice as a public defender in two
states.
112 HEUMANN, supra note 16, at 143. One would expect to see this same sort of norm-
based modification of entitlements in civil contexts. Consider, for example, a tenant or debtor
who insists upon ajury trial in an eviction proceeding brought by a landlord or creditor.
113 See FLEMMING ET AL., supra note 16, at 110, 118-19 (recounting judges in other
jurisdictions refening to "unnecessary" or 'illegitimate" trials); cf. Resnik, supra note 35, at
402 (suggesting that federal judges in civil cases coerce settlements by implying "the judge
would take a dim, and possibly hostile, view of either side's insistence on going to trial").
114 See In re Inquiry Concerning Judge Damron, 487 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1985). In this case,
ajudge was removed from office for, among other things, the following on-the-record colloquy
with a defendant who was before the judge for violating probation by failing to pay a fine:
"DEFENDANT: Would there be any time involved in this once everything is paid off?' Id. at
3. "JUDGE DAMRON: If you want to go to a jury trial for not paying your fine, it would be.
The taxpayers won't pay for something that's so foolish." Id. In a separate case, the judge "told
[a party] she would receive the maximum sentence upon conviction if she persisted in her plea
of not guilty." Id. Judge Damron also threatened punishment for insisting on the right to
counsel. "JUDGE DAMRON: ... You can have an attomey if you want, and that way I can
give you two years. You want me to get you a public defender? DEFENDANT: No, sir.
JUDGE DAMRON: I didn't think you did ... " Id. at 2.
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months in jail.115 Legislatures, however, have not funded courts (plus
prosecutors and defenders) sufficiently to provide jury trials for even a
substantial minority of cases.116 Not every defendant wants a trial, and many
factors go into decisions whether to plead guilty or to stand trial; 1 7 judicial (and
attorney) pressure on parties, driven by funding limits, is surely a major factor. In
response to incompatible decisions from competing institutions, trial-level
professionals evolve norms to mediate the conflict. The norm sub silentio
rewrites the formal legal rule but in accord with implicit legislative
preferences."18 Radical as the notion is in light of prevailing doctrine, the norm
could be a sensible regime for severely limited trial resources: if trials can be
handled for only a small portion of cases, judges and lawyers should prescreen
them and reserve juries for certain close factual or legal issues.
Such norms should signal to appellate courts that doctrines may be
unworkable and need to be re-evaluated, at least to the extent that resources
motivate the norm. Norms driven by such tensions are disturbing only in the
sense of the canary in the coal mine: they identify a problem in need of response.
The Supreme Court's decisions extending the jury trial right have prompted no
real increase in the use of juries. The values that drove those decisions have been
implicitly rejected by other policymakers, particularly legislators.
It is likely that, with some jury trial resources diverted to minor
misdemeanors, fewer felonies are tried by jury than otherwise. Jury doctrine may
have diverted policymakers from choosing a more feasible regime to serve some
of the same goals. If lay participation in criminal adjudication is the underlying
goal, it may be preferable to try more felonies by jury and resolve misdemeanor
cases with a form of lay magistrates rather than juries, which has long been the
English practice." 9 The Supreme Court's cases concerning the right to a jury
11 5 See Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 541-42 (1989); Baldwin v.
New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
1 16 See generally Stephen . Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 HARV. L.
REv. 1037 (1984) (concluding from empirical studies that about one quarter of felony
defendants would want to plead guilty even without inducements, and that 75% of felony cases
could be resolved by bench trials with only small increases in judicial resources).
117 The literature on plea bargaining is voluminous. One recent historical study attributes
early development of the practice to the need in the 1830s and 1840s to strengthen local
government, social order, and political stability. See Mary E. Vogel, The Social Origins ofPlea
Bargaining: Conflict and the Law in the Process of State Formation, 1830-1860, 33 L. &
Soc'yREv. 161 (1999).
118 Note the implications that this raises for judicial constitutional interpretation as an
anti-majoritarian check a topic beyond the scope of this paper.
119 Bill Pizzi, in his recent book criticizing America's criminal trial process, endorses the
lay magistrate approach. See WHLLAM T. P1724 TALiS WrHOUT 'MUTH 105-06, 224-27
(1999).
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prevent jurisdictions from experimenting with such alternatives. While they can
offer lay magistrate adjudication, they cannot remove the misdemeanor jury trial
right without reducing sentences; they can discourage misdemeanor juries only
by subterfuge like the trial-penalty norm.
Similarly, the expert-funds norm may have achieved a policy preferable to
the extension of Ake to all criminal cases. If the public policy, reflected in
legislative funding levels, is not to provide useful experts in every criminal case,
then rationing funds to reserve them solely for serious cases is sensible. If experts
provide fact finders with useful information, they should increase the accuracy of
judgments and reduce erroneous convictions. 120 Rationing expert funds by the
type of case-more funds for felonies, less for misdemeanors-should lead to
differential error rates. One may justifiably aim for a lower error rate for felonies
than for misdemeanors, in which the stakes are lower.121 Some state
jurisdictions, in their interpretations of Ake, have limited the entitlement to
felonies.122 Others have not,123 and in those we should expect the local level
expert-fumds norm to be common. 12 4 Although it achieves much the same end as
doctrinal revision, the norm does so in a less desirable way, denies in practice
what the law offers in public, and makes policy in an institutional setting less
public and trustworthy than court and legislative decisions. In such contexts,
norms that revise legal rules are signals that courts themselves need to revisit
rules.125
120 1 am holding aside disputes about experts who cause more confusion than clarity and
whose testimony is more partisan bias than fact. I depend on the limited contention that at least
a subset of experts provide useful information and views that improve fact-finding compared to
a process without expert testimony.
121 The same rationale would support a norm discouraging appeals in misdemeanor cases
and reserving those resources for more serious convictions-but that calculus may not hold if
the value of the appeal is clarification of an important rule (many Supreme Court cases arose
from misdemeanors) rather than the defendant's conviction and sentence.
122 See, e.g., Husske v. Commonwealth, 448 S.E.2d 331 (Va. App. 1994).
123 See, e.g., Elmore v. State, 968 S.W.2d 462 (Tex. App. 1998); Ventura v. State, 801
S.W.2d 225 (Tex. App. 1990).
124 In Elmore, the Texas Court of Appeals held that Ake funds could be available to
defendants charged with misdemeanor DUI on appropriate facts and noted the economic
burden this could put on local governments, which it cautioned should not outweigh an
individual's right to fair adjudication. See Elmore, 968 S.W.2d at 466.
125 A recent decision reiterating state case law that some trial courts had resisted might be
another example of trial courts signaling that a fonnal rule is impractical or of little value in
practice. In Gwartz v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. App. 4th 480, 481 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999), the
court reprimanded judges "on the local superior court bench" who refused parties an
opportunity for oral argument on summary judgment motions despite what the appellate court
here describes as clear case law mandating oral argument While the argument rule serves
public and party interests in procedures that aid at least the appearance of due process (which
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This analysis emphasizes resource constraints. However, implicit in both
norms are rationales of distributive justice, which help explain judges' normative
view of their actions and which ease the norms' conflict with party entitlement
and judges' professional obligations. For the expert-funds norm, the rationale
may work like this: only wealthy litigants can afford to pay for experts in such
cases; most middle-class litigants cannot 126 Ake, fully implemented by zealous
defense counsel, would therefore effectively give indigent litigants more
justice-a larger entitlement that improves outcome accuracy-than working
people would get. This is unfair. Thus, real justice requires restricting Ake funds,
perhaps only to clear cases where even middle-class people would purchase an
expert. Fairness requires a sanction to discourage Ake motions by indigent
defendants who insist on more entitlements than others receive.
The same sort of rationale supports the trial-penalty norm. This norm
implies judgments about entitlements to procedural justice ("cases without
conflicting factual evidence are not entitled to trial") and distributive justice
("those who admit guilt deserve more favorable treatment than those who do
notf). Note the norm rations trial resources by reserving trials for cases with
close factual or legal questions.12 7 It represses other public process values and a
trial judges might undervalue), the trial judges' resistance may indicate that argument is of little
real use to courts' decisionmaking, especially in light of docket constraints those courts face.
Like a rule mandating jury trials in all cases, the rule here may not work well in all cases and
court contexts, and the judges' resistance, like a norm, may signal that problem.
126 Ecnomists presumably would point out that many middle-class parties could find the
fimds-several hundred dollars or more--to pay for an expert, but would conclude the cost not
worth the relatively small ex ante chance that the expert's analysis and testimony would
favorably affect the outcome of the case. Thus, they choose not to have an expert rather than be
denied one due to their limited means.
127 In as much as it revises the trial right in this way, the norm is analogous to lay
"commonsense justice" views that conflict with legal rules and affect jury decisions. See
generally FINKEL, supra note 72 (discussing studies that indicate jury decisions are affected by
lay standards of intuitive justice), and that inform other "nullification" acts by judges and
prosecutors; see also MORTIMER KADISH & SANFORD KADiSH, DISCRETION TO DISOBEY 45-
66, 80-85 (1973); Simon, supra note 73, at 1116-17 (describing discretionary prosecution
decisions as "routine" nullification). Arguably, the norm revision of substantive law is less
legitimate than analogous jury action. At least the jury is a democratic, deliberative body with a
mandate specified in case law to temper law application with community justice sentiments.
See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (stating that the jury should bring to its
verdict "the commonsense judgment of the community"); Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503
(1972). The norm, in contrast, is largely a product of the professional actors against whose bias
the case law designs such protections as the jury trial. See Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530 (explaining
the jury is "a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor"); Johnson v. Louisiana,
406 U.S. 356, 373 (1972) (stating that the jury checks the risk of a "compliant, biased, or
eccentric judge').
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party's subjective preference for trial over settlement.128
Infusing norms with justice notions--to view them as right, even when they
contradict a formal rule-reduces the cognitive dissonance of professionals who
are compelled by resources to ration entitlements. However, it also helps drive
norms to undercut rules beyond what material constraints and policy conflicts
require. In a telling study of two similar counties in the same state, David Lynch
found one had a substantially higher rate ofjury trials than the other, a difference
that could not be attributed to flmding or any other factor beyond local custom
and preferences of judges and (some) attorneys. Both jurisdictions disposed of
fewer than half of the cases by jury trial. Part of the need for nontrial dispositions
is surely limited budgets, but only part. The study suggests that the difference in
the two counties' trial rates was attributable to norms not dictated by resource
constraints. Lynch describes judges using several sanctions to enforce personal
trial-rate preferences. Other studies confirm that finding in other jurisdictions.129
Even with norms driven in large part by resource pressures, then, justice notions
and self-serving personal preferences have an independent effect130
This effect is unfortunate. The trial-penalty norm alters the behavior of every
player in the system. Judges alter sentencing decisions to enforce it. Prosecutors
increase sentencing recommendations after trial in accord with the norm.
Defense attorneys will change their strategic thinking and client advice in light of
it; they may pressure clients to plea in "unreasonable" cases, independent of the
risk of a penalty or even the attorney's self-interest with respect to fees for court
appointments. 131 Clients (especially those who are risk averse), when informed
128 See Geimer, supra note 98, at 10-11 tbl. (citing Fourth, Fifth, and other Circuit Court
cases as well as state court cases from Virginia, Tennessee, North Carolina, Georgia, Florida,
and Alabama).
129 See Lynch, supra note 20. For other studies, see, for example, Schulhofer, supra note
116 (concluding from empirical studies that about one quarter of felony defendants would want
to plead guilty even without inducements, and that 75% of felony cases could be resolved by
bench trials with only small increases in judicial resources); c. Teresa White Cams & John A.
Kruse, Alaska's Ban on Plea Bargaining Reevaluated, 75 JUDICATURE 310, 317 (1992)
(describing widely different rates of plea bargaining between Fairbanks and Anchorage,
Alaska, and attributing the difference largely to the chief prosecutors' differing views on the
desirability of bargains rather than on resource constraints).
130 This observation is consistent with research on organizational theory and
institutionalism, which describes perceptions within institutional environments that some
practices are compelled by necessity, such as resource limits, when in fact they are contingent
institutional choices. See generally DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 57.
131 In some jurisdictions, it is surely the unreasonably low cap on fees for trials that
encourages attorneys to urge guilty pleas. However, this is not always the case and does not
mean the norm cannot have an independent effect. One state court judge has observed with
dismay the widespread use of pleas in his jurisdiction, despite a seemingly generous fee scale
that should encourage counsel to recommend trials to criminal defendants. See E-mail from
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of the norm, will change preferences as well. It adds the strong weight of private
normative views to the public criteria on which sentencing policy is based. In
addition to considerations of retribution, moral blame, or deterrence, for instance,
judges' sentencing decisions-and prosecutors' recommendations-will be
driven by the trial-penalty norm.132 The expert-funds norm similarly affects
every player's decisions and undermines the public purposes of the doctrine, and
the same risk exists for the public values protected by other rules.133 It is
disturbing that local practice groups devise norms that undermine formal rules.
Doctrinal revision can reduce that behavior to the extent resources dictate it. To
the extent norms are a function of self-interested action mixed with ideological
commitments, however, the problem is a failure of professionalism and the
remedy is more complicated.
D. Collegial Fair-Dealing Norm
In contrast to the discovery norm, which aims to achieve informally much of
what formal rules achieve, and the trial-penalty norm, which in part responds to
material pressures stemming from conflicts between courts and legislatures, what
this Article calls the fair-dealing norm illustrates a norm driven entirely by
private justice standards. A vivid example comes from a county study in which a
defense lawyer freely described a fair-dealing norm among opposing attorneys
that included an obligation not to "take advantage" of an opposing prosecutor,
even if the norm behavior injured his client.
''There have been many cases where a D.A. has made a deal with me and I
look at him and I say, 'Hey, that's not enough. You're too low on the case.' The
guy says he wants a $250 fine. I say, 'No, make him pay $500.' Because it's
fair."134
This example is one of several such instances found in the study in which
Hon. Steven Russell, Texas State Court Judge, to Crimprof listserve (July 31, 1998) (noting a
county in which defense counsel usually plea for clients the day of appointment, despite a fee
of $75 per guilty plea compared to $250-500 per day or partial day in court for trials).
132 See BAUM, supra note 46, at 85-87 (discussing the issue of whether judges sentence
on legitimate or illegitimate criteria). For a brief survey of theories of sentencing policy, see
RICHARD G. GARDNER & MARTIN R. SINGER, CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT: CASES, MATERIALS,
AND READINGS IN CRuNAL LAWV 31-124 (2d ed. 1996).
133 A norm against challenges to nondiverse juries, for example, neglects the public cost
of adjudication with unrepresentative juries, which include public perceptions of an illegitimate
justice system, risk of inaccurate fact-finding, and a reduced check on prosecutors. See, e.g.,
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522,530 (1975); Peters v. Kiff 407 U.S. 493, 503 (1972).
134 NARDULu ET AL., supra note 15, at 135; see also FLEMMING Er AL., supra note 16, at
141;.
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attorneys followed the fair-dealing norm to a client's detriment.135 David Engel
documents comparable conduct in a rural county's tort practice. "A lot of people
are more conducive to settlement here just because they're attempting to be fair,"
one attorney explained. Yet the attorney confirmed Engel's broader finding that
tort settlements generally were for medical expenses only, without compensation
for other damages such as pain and suffering, despite the strength of such
claims.136 (Indeed, it seems that the merit of such claims often went unknown;
Engel found "discovery after the filing of a lawsuit was almost never used" in the
county.)137 Engel found that attorneys endorsed such fairness attitudes implicitly
by letting such norms guide their practice decisions; one judge described it as a
sign of local lawyers' "maturity." 138
This sort of norm is telling in several respects. The norm clearly contradicts
the attorney's duty of zealous advocacy and obligation to serve her client's
interests. 139 It reveals the attorney's relative independence from her client and
the client's inability to monitor her agent. (One would not expect this norm to be
strong in white-collar crime or corporate practices.140 It would be unlikely even
in comparable county criminal court systems that had less collegial relations.) 141
More significantly, this fair-dealing norm reveals the power of private justice
standards (shared among professionals), which justify a norm that strongly
contradicts formal professional obligations and yet serves no utilitarian function
13 5 The same attorney justified his refusal to 'judge-shop" for forums that might favor his
client with similar emphasis on maintaining credibility with other attorneys and the court. See
NARDULLI Er AL., supra note 15, at 135; see also FL4EMMING ET AL, supra note 16, at 141. One
defense attorney said, "[t]here are times when you gotta go in and tell the judge, 'Don't give
my guy probation. He's gonna screw up."' Another described strategy of allocating his
professional effort among various clients: "[w]hat I do is I save the nol proses [dismissal
requests] for the cases I think really deserve it. And the probations for the cases I think deserve
it. On the other cases, it's '[djon't do the crime if you can't do the time."' Id. (emphasis added).
13 6 See David M. Engel, Cases, Conflict and Accommodation: Patterns of Legal
Interaction in an.American Community, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 803, 854.
137 Id at 854-55.
13 8 Id. at 854.
13 9 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7, E.C. 7.1 (1980), and
MODEL RuLEs OF PROFEsSIONAL CONDucr Rules 12, 1.3 (1997).
140 Cf. Nelson, supra note 81, at 511-28. Nelson found that corporate attorneys' views of
their practice area over time converge with their clients' positions, such that specialization in
this practice context shapes attorney valuations of legal issues. That sort of convergence, of
course, reduces the agency problems that yield such effects as the examples of a fair-dealing
norm discussed here.
141 See, e.g., NARDULLI Er AL., supra note 15, at 134 (describing the practice in DuPage
County, Illinois, criminal courts as more adversarial, with much weaker collegiality among
opponents, due largely to a prosecutor uninterested in cooperative relations).
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such as resource rationing.
The fair-dealing norm drastically reconceives professional roles, especially
for the criminal defense attorney, from a partisan advocate serving the client's
subjective interests to a more neutral professional helping to mediate a version of
objective fairness. It shows a shift from adversarial processes of case resolution
to one of collegial cooperation among relative elites. Thus, it contains the risks of
shifting decisions from public processes to private ones. To the extent tort
lawyers refuse to seek pain and suffering damages, for example, it undermines
doctrines or statutes that authorize those damages for such cases in addition to
disserving their clients. Criminal lawyers deny their clients zealous counsel (if
not minimally effective counsel) and thereby undermine the process of
adversarial adjudication among competent opponents that helps legitimate the
criminal process. 142 In this instance, however, while the norm undermines public
values, courts and legislatures have no easy way to respond to the norm with rule
revision. 143 The response, if there is one, must come from professionalism rules,
malpractice actions, and local attorneys themselves.
E. Ambiguity of Norms
How attorneys should respond to norms sometimes is unclear due to the
variety of norms and their effects. Some norms that discourage resort to formal
procedures and substantive entitlements are normatively acceptable. Consider
norms, revealed in Heumann's description of young criminal attorneys, that
discourage pretrial motions. Heumann finds that new attorneys who frequently
seek trials and file all plausible motions incur informal sanctions that eventually
chill their zeal for full procedural litigation. On the other hand, in what at first
seems a contradiction, new defense attorneys learn that if they pursue plausible
motions (or merely indicate their plan to do so), they receive a form of reward.
To avoid litigating the motion, prosecutors will sweeten a plea bargain offer.
Similarly, as the defense approaches a trial date without accepting a plea offer,
the prosecutor may reward that determination with an improved offer. Heumann
explains these apparently mixed signals by observing that prosecutors and judges
distinguish between what they deem frivolous and meritorious motions.144 That
142 Se Stricldand v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (discussing "the law's
presumption that [defense] counsel will fulfil the role in the adversary process" and thereby
"render the trial a reliable adversarial testing process").
143 This assumes, as the Supreme Court has made clear, that the judicial standard for
ineffective assistance of counsel will not change dramatically to scrutinize defense counsel
much more rigorously. See id. at 688 (stating that the "measure of attorney performance
remains simply reasonableness" that does not undermine trial outcome).
144 See HEUMANN, supra note 16, at 74.
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is, they reward strong motions and sanction frivolous ones.
If the work group's consensus is normatively acceptable-driven by good
faith merits assessment rather than by the desire to avoid work or to chill
attorney zeal-then this norm teaches good judgment. The attorney learns to
assess motions carefully before raising them and to forgo marginal motions. She
learns, in effect, to make trade offs (as legal rules do at a broader policy level)
between fairness and efficiency. The norm thereby implies a conception of the
attorney's role (further addressed in the next section) as a professional who
rightly weighs interests beyond her client's.145 The attorney makes strategic
judgments in light of public resource constraints as well as her client's
interests. 146
In more ambiguous instances, whether a norm is good or bad, whether it
justifiably burdens a client's claims for public values or merely serves
professionals' self-interest and private justice views, will depend on contextual
examination. Some norms serve client interests partially and indirectly. An
attorney may observe a norm of settlement to preserve good relations with a
judge or opposing counsel in future cases. The present client may get a lesser
outcome than she would through more zealous litigation, but the client also
benefits from the relationship her attorney maintains by observing norms here
and in previous cases. While she suffers a cost from the norm in this case, she
may reap some benefit from the attorney's general adherence to it.147 The
balance can be difficult to calculate in any given case.
Nonetheless, from the sample examined below, practice norms can be
mapped along a continuum with resource constraints as the motivating cause at
one end and self-dealing and ideological motivations at the other. This rough
taxonomy clarifies the signals that one should take from norms and, as discussed
in the final Part, identifies which players can respond to norms.
1451 assume here that attorneys filed at least marginal motions in their client's interest.
146 For an influential discussion of attorneys' duties to consider interests beyond the
client's, see generally Simon, supra note 73. 1 discuss Simon's arguments infra Part IVJ3.
14 7 If an attorney forgoes zealous advocacy for a client to preserve relations with judges
and opponents, the present client's interests are to some degree sacrificed so that the attorney
can be more effective for future clients. That detriment might be offset, however, by the gains
this client reaps from the attorney's adherence to cooperative norms with prior clients. Cf Marc
Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9
L. & Soc'Y REv. 95, 117 (1974) ("[T]he demands of routine and orderly handling of a whole
series of [one-shot clients] may constrain the lawyer from maximizing advantage for any
individual ... .
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Table - Motivating Causes of Practice Norms
juy trials discovery jury trials jury trials
(n portion) (portion beyond n) (portion beyond n)
epertfunds "fair dealing"
closing argument
Note that the trial norm appears at both ends of the continuum because, while some large portion trial
restrictions (n) are due to resource constraints, some jurisdictions further restrict trials solely in
accord with self-interest (e.g., reduced workload) or ideological motivations. The discovery norm lies
midway on the continuum because its causes are mixed.
Norms on the left side are fairly legitimate responses to conditions that arise
from political choices of appellate courts' institutional competitors, the
legislative and executive branches. Holding aside arguments that challenge the
legitimacy of legislative judgments (from public choice concerns about
legislative self-dealing and political theory debates about majoritarian dominance
of minorities), these trial-level norms should prompt appellate courts to re-
evaluate doctrines that reflect the considered judgment of professionals
responding to conflicting public mandates. Even if they want to, local players can
do little to change these norms. Those on the right side, in contrast, are fully in
control of local lawyers and judges, and their weak legitimacy claims argue for
their revision. In addition, both sorts of norms can mislead attorneys from the
commitments of their professional role and ill-serve the public and client, whose
interests lawyers must safeguard. 148 The next Part explores some of those
detrimental effects.
IV. ASSESSING EFrE OFPRACnCE NORMS
A. Devaluation of Parties' Subjective Preferences
The literature on legal ethics and the attorney-client relationship divides in
large part on the priority accorded to client autonomy and the attorney's ability to
act on considerations other than client interests. The question is how fully the
attorney is obligated to facilitate and abide by the client's preferences rather than
mediate that obligation with personal morals and societal or legal interests. In
148 See Menkel-Meadow & Meadow, supra note 82, at 245 (discussing the significant
effects that role conceptions can have on attorneys and reviewing similar literature); Sunstein,
supra note 70, at 940 (arguing "'c]hoices are pervasively a function of social role"); cf. BAUM,
supra note 46, at 85 (discussing "evidence that [judges'] role conceptions make a difference for
judging').
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other words, is the attorney solely an amoral agent for the client's wishes, or does
the attorney balance the agency duty with public, professional, or third-party
obligations?
It is obvious by this point that practice norms compromise client autonomy
and lead the lawyer to mediate client interests with other interests. Practice
norms often lead attorneys to discount or misperceive parties' subjective
valuations of their disputes and their preferences about the options and processes
used to resolve them. 149 This effect of practice norms conflicts with a prominent
conception of the lawyer's role that is the basis for legal education's leading
approach to client relations, client-centered counseling,150 and with related
approaches to legal ethics that give priority to client autonomy and conceive of
lawyers largely as amoral agents bound by their clients' interests and
preferences. 15 1
Professionals tend to assume and impose objective preferences for litigating
parties; norms further that tendency.152 Different clients may want to litigate
149 While skewed to the interests of lawyers and judges, norms can still be said to serve
objective social welfare through such goals as conserving court resources and resolving
disputed factual questions. See ELLICKSON, supra note 11, at 170-72. Microeconomics accepts
the inability to compare interpersonal utility. See, e.g., JAMES COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF
SOciAL THEORY 769-72 (1989); ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 23
(1997); Michael Hechter & Satoshi Kanazawa, Sociological Rational Choice Theory, 23 ANN.
REV. SOC. 191, 194-95, 208 (1997) (discussing the same problem with respect to rational
choice theory).
150 The leading text on client-centered counseling, and the dominant text in law school
client counseling courses for two decades, is Lawyers as Counselors. See BINDER ET AL., supra
note 2; see also Robert D. Dinerstein, Clinical Texts and Contexts, 39 UCLA L. REV. 697, 700
(1992) (book review) (describing "the tremendous influence on clinical law teachers" of the
Binder book).
151 For examples, see MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 57
(1990); Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem, and
Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613, 614.
152 Cf. BINDER Er AL., supra note 2, at 17-18 (describing lawyers' "taditional view" of
client problems and the "traditional approach" to solutions as involving "minimal client
input!); Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and Refinement, 32
ARIZ. L. REV. 501, 579 (1990) (noting that lawyers "tend to define client problems into
particular categories" which leads lawyers to call "for relatively straightforward solutions," a
practice that may "reflect a fundamental lack of sympathy for the client's perspective");
William L. F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming,
Blaming, Claiming..., 15 L. & SOC'Y REV. 631, 645 (1980-1981) ("There is evidence that
lawyers often shape disputes to fit their own interests rather than those of their clients."). For an
argument that lawyers should put high priority on clients' subjective preferences for litigation
goals apart from the case's objective value, see generally Dennis P. Stolle et al., Integrating
Preventive Law and Therapeutic Jurisprudence: A Law and Psychology Based Approach to
Lawyering, 34 CAL. W. L. REv. 15 (1997).
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similar claims very differently; comparable claims arise in different contexts and
implicate different nonlegal consequences. 153 Just as market prices are in fact
only objective approximations of the subjective value of goods to any given
contracting party,154 the objective value of a legal claim-the money damages in
a civil action, or restitution and punishment at issue in a criminal action-are
only second-best approximations of a claim's subjective value to a client. Many
legal disputes, and the processes used to resolve them, 155 have significant
personal or emotional value to disputants.156 A legal strategy motivated by
concern for a party's subjective preferences with regard both to outcomes and
procedure will often be different from one focused on a rational maximization of
153 See BINDERET AL., supra note 2, at 3; id at 5-15 (describing how nonlegal concerns
can change client preferences on legal strategies and options); cf. Pildes, supra note 55, at 937,
955-59 (discussing how citizen preferences, with respect to goods regulated by public policy,
vary with context and cultural values).
154 See ELLICKSON, supra note 11, at 170-74.
155 Cf Tyler, supra note 81, at 104-05 (finding a strong focus on procedural fairness
even among criminal defendants facing long sentences). For a description of a client in a civil
case who expresses subjective preferences in a divorce case that include 'Tight[ing the]
injustice" of an improper restraining order and "an acknowledgment that she has been treated
unjustly," while her attorney pushes the case toward an objective value focused on "the real
business" of a property settlement, see SARAT & FELSrINER, supra note 29, at 94. See also
Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745,759 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that a litigant may
want to "press the argument that he is innocent' despite easier means of victory or "insist on
certain arguments for political reasons"); Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives:
Recognizing Client Narrative in Case Theory, 93 MICH. L. REV. 485, 565-66 (1994) (arguing
for collaboration between clients and lawyers in formulating case theory and noting clients may
choose one theory over another for noninstrumental reasons such as "vindication," "personal
integrity," or the chance to "establish an important legal principle").
Noninstnmmental concems play a large role in justice system experiences; people focus on
fair processes as much as, or more than, outcomes. See TYLER, supra note 81, at 101, 112, 116.
Procedural justice is the primary influence on judgments about justice processes and
satisfaction with third-party decisions. See id at 107; see also Tom R. Tyler, Psychological
Models of the Justice Motive: Antecedents of Distributive and Procedural Justice, 67 J.
PERSONALuTY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 850, 857 (1994). People place high value on "process
control," the opportunity to speak to those who control case outcomes in an attempt to
influence the decision. See Tom R. Tyler & Kathleen M. McGraw, Ideology and the
Interpretation of Personal Experience: Procedural Justice and Political Quiescence, 42 J.
Soc. ISSUEs 115,121 (1986).
15 6 See BiNDER Er AL., supra note 2, at 5-15. Indeed, because people forgo litigation of
most legal claims, one might think that those claims that are in fact litigated, at least in some
class of cases (torts, for instance), arise because litigants disproportionately place considerable
subjective value on vindication beyond formal money or liberty claims. See Richard L. Abel,
The Real Tort Crisis-Too Few Claims, 48 OHIO ST. Li. 443, 447 (1987).
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objectively defined resources.157
This point corresponds with broader problems in determining values that
affect public policymaking. Expert cost-benefit analysis tends to impose
objective assessments of values that conflict with popular, subjective valuations.
Values are functions of social contexts from which they cannot be abstracted.1 58
Experts tend to understate the value of "soft" variables. In regulatory
policymaking, those may include the value of clean air, better health, and
increased auto safety; parties to litigation may have any number of comparably
soft values, arising, for example, from dignitary or vindication concerns. 159
157 Recent scholarship on client counseling and lawyering theory, as well as teaching
approaches to those topics, has given some attention to this problem and provides illuminating
cases studies. See Clark D. Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, Representation as Text:
Towards an Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1298, 1300-01 & nn.7-11
(1992) (citing sources); Tanina Rostain, The Company We Keep: Kronman's The Lost Lawyer
and the Development of Moral Imagination in the Pracice of Law, 21 L. & Soc. INQUIRY
1017, 1033 & nn.51-57 (1996) (book review) (discussing sources).
Clark Curningham has described a misdemeanor criminal matter that held significant
dignitary and emotional value for the client. See Cunningham, supra at 1303-31. The client
was an African-American man stopped in his car at night by two white policeman. Based on
the client's account, the police were excessively rough and rude, stopped him on a pretext
because he drove an expensive car, and fabricated a charge of disturbing the peace because the
client exercised his right not to cooperate with the officers. See id. Cunningham recounts his
own misperception of the client's understanding and valuation of the case. Despite
Cunningham's creative attempts to serve his client's preferences, see id. at 1326-28
(recounting a proposal to let the client cross-examine a key witness in a jury trial aimed at
"giving him a voice in the courtroom" and achieving his goal of "restoration of his dignity"),
the client was extremely dissatisfied with both his lawyer's representation and the substantive
outcome, which was objectively very favorable-4he charge was dismissed. See a at 1328-
30. In addition to formal exoneration, the client wanted a process that acknowledged the moral
wrong done to him by the officers. See id. That strong client preference could be met through
the mechanism of a hearing on a suppression motion or a trial. Yet that requires an attorney not
only to learn the subjective preferences of his client but also to honor them by resisting routine
strategies for case resolution, routines that may be enforced by norms. See also Caplin &
Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 647 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting the
need for a "maverick" lawyer to resist judges' "preference for nonconfrontational styles of
advocacy" enforced by sanctions).
158 See Pildes, supra note 55, at 955-65. See also, e.g., Elizabeth Anderson, Values, Risks
and Market Norms, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 54, 60-62 (1988) (discussing how workers assess
workplace risks, and how those assessments vary depending on the particular job and the
personal value they place on the work); id at 959.
159 Similarly, in risk analysis, lay judgments depend much more upon the contextual
features in which the risk arises than upon expert judgments, such that quantitatively identical
risks are treated differently depending on such factors as whether one has control over
exposure to the risk and what benefits one receives from the risky activity. See Richard H.
Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CH. L. REV. 1, 58-61
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Public interests in adjudication are also qualitative and thus hard to value.160 One
proposal for the problem in regulatory policymaking is improved democratic,
deliberative processes that increase consideration of lay valuations that conflict
with expert judgment. 161 In the litigation setting, an analogous response is client-
centered counseling, which gives increased attention to clients' subjective
preferences. Practice norms constrain such counseling, and norms themselves
often suffer from the same elite bias and lack of democratic deliberation that
skews regulatory policies.
Moreover, client wishes are themselves contingent on the context of the
client's problem and the attorney-client relationship. The client's choices among
legal strategies and entitlements depend significantly on the attorney conveying
information and expertise and on exploring with the client the legal and nonlegal
implications of various options.162 Client preferences often are not firm prior to
counseling; lawyers cannot simply effectuate expressed wishes. 163 A premise of
client-centered counseling, as well as competing conceptions of the legal
counseling that urge lawyers to more explicitly raise moral implications of client
choices, 164 is that client preferences are endogenous to the attorney-client
(1995). Extending that pattern to choices for trial, parties will vary in their willingness to forgo
settlement and risk a trial according to background issues of their cases. Trials with the same
expected utility (favorable outcome discounted by the chance of loss) will be more or less
appealing to clients based not only on personal tastes for risk but also on varying desires to
argue publicly the contexts of legal issues. For ethnographic evidence of attorneys who
objectify and reshape client preferences, see generally SARAT & FELSTINER, supra note 29
(documenting attorney-client relations in divorce cases).
160 See Resnik, supra note 35, at 430 (identifying public "values of due process" to
include "the accuracy of decisionmaking, the adequacy of reasoning, and the quality of
adjudication').
161 See Pildes, supra note 55, at 955-66; Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 159, at 58-61.
162 Clients thus face a version of the imperfect-information problem. See COOTER &
ULEN, supra note 149, at 48.
163 Even if clients come to the lawyer with firmly set preferences, the lawyer has a
professional obligation to ensure that the client has arrived at that choice with full consideration
of all options and consequences. See BINDER ET AL, supra note 2, at 16-23. More broadly, pre-
existing client choices are suspect for the reasons expressed that preferences generally are
suspect: they may be a function of the client's pre-existing wealth endowment The client may
prefer another option if she knew it to be within her means. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note
149, at 23; Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 159, at 76-80.
164 Scholars including Anthony Kronman urge the counseling process to be one in which
the lawyer employs moral imagination to assume the client's perspective and deliberates with
the client to clarify-and assess the wisdom of-client preferences. See ANTHONY T.
KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 132-33 (1993); see also THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F.
COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERs, CLIENs, AND MORAL RESPONsIBKXIrY 40-54 (1994) (discussing the
role of "lawyer as friend" as similar to Kronman's view); Rostain, supra note 157, at 1027-33
(discussing and criticizing Kronman's approach).
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relafionship 165 (thus the risk of diminishing client autonomy in counseling). Yet
information and advice can rarely be conveyed neutrally; it will contain the
attorney's subjective perspective, either consciously or unconsciously. 166
Practice norms can have tremendous if subtle effects on client counseling as well
as on choices the attorney typically makes (for example, discovery motions)
without client input. Lawyering literature 167 reveals that even well-intentioned
attorneys have difficulty understanding clients' subjective preferences and
fulfilling them in light of norms that undermine legal entitlements.168 Norms,
165 See BINDER ET AL., supra note 2, at 16-23; see also KRONMAN, supra note 164, at
128-34 (discussing the role of lawyers in shaping and clarifying client goals); William H.
Simon, Lawyer Advice and Client Autonomy: Mrs. Jones's Case, 50 MD. L. REV. 213, 217-18
(1991) (describing how client preferences can change in response to subtle rephrasing of
attorney advice); SPANGLER, supra note 81, at 60 (describing an attorney who notes '.[t]he sad
fact is ... I can essentially make it [a client's business decision] myself by presenting the
choices in a sufficiently slanted way"). This is not to suggest that clients do not have strong
preferences independent of their lawyers' counsel. Evidence is clear that many do, and that
attorney counseling may ignore these preferences or coercively persuade clients against them.
However, an absolute baseline of "client preference," to which an attorney can neutrally offer
information and then effectuate a client's preference, is often not a useful conception of the
situation.
166 See Dinerstein, supra note 152, at 567-69 (discussing the "numerous problems"
advice-giving presents for lawyers committed to fostering client autonomy, including
premature advice that "may prevent the client from making her own choice in her own way").
167 See, e.g., SARAT & FELSTINER, supra note 29, at 94 (recounting a client's statements
to her lawyer in a divorce case that she wanted to "fight [the] injustice" of an improper
restraining order imposed on her and how she looked to her attorney to "protect [her] from
horrible things like judicial abuse[,]" while for the attorney, "that kind ofjustice simply gets in
the way of what for him is the real business of divorce: to reach a property settlement, not to
right wrongs or vindicate justice"); id. at 114-15 (describing the same client reminding her
attorney that "a reasonable property settlement... is not her exclusive concern" and seeking to
"expand[ ] the law's agenda" to seek "vindication," which the attorney views as "a peripheral
concern"); see also GRErA BIRD, THE PROCESS OF LAW IN AusRALA: NTERCULTURAL
PERSPECrIVES 196-98 (2d ed. 1993) (noting the widespread tendency in Australian courts of
barrister dominance and control of the client, treating as routine and fungible matters that, to
clients, are highly emotional and individual); Michelle S. Jacobs, Legal Professionalism: Do
Ethical Rules Require Zealous Representation for Poor People?, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 97,
101 (1995) (arguing that routine cases for lawyers are, from the client's view "hardly routine");
Miller, supra note 155, at 552-70 (urging client participation in case theory and planning, both
for instrumental advantages in litigation and to serve a normative preference for client control
of their own cases).
168 While most of the data I use here involves criminal practice, research indicates civil
parties are just as likely to have subjective preferences that attorneys are likely to undervalue.
See generally SARAT & FEImsrINER, supra note 29 (documenting divorce clients' preferences,
which are often altered or ignored by attorneys). Conley and O'Barr, in their study of litigants
in small claims courts, characterize many parties as "relational," focusing on the social context
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built upon objective valuations of claims and of procedural entitlements, further
hinder attorneys' abilities to be guided by clients' wishes; they perpetuate
lawyers' objectification of client claims.169 Professional socialization, of which
norms are a central tool, reinforces the practice.170 Instead of mediating client
ends in light of public norms that inhere in law, lawyers must mediate them with
regard to norms that may subvert law's public commitments. Moreover, even
when attorneys overcome the tendency to objectify claims and are committed to
client-centered practice, norms hinder them from doing so. In a norm setting, the
attorney's choice is not one between equally available strategies; counsel face
resistance from other lawyers and judges who enforce norms171 (in addition to
case load or resource pressures that also discourage client-centered practice).1 72
and relationships of the dispute. This perspective seems to correlate with parties who have
stronger process preferences and are less likely to agree with objective valuation of the cases.
See JOHN M. CONLEY & WLLIAM M. O'BARR, RULEs VERSUS RELATIONSHPs: THE
ETHNOGRAPHY OF LEGAL DISCOURSE 58-61 (1990); id. at 127-31 (describing a contract case
in which the plaintiff won a default judgment and the judge concluded "she got everything she
wanted," while the plaintiff indicated that she was 'Turious [that she] didn't get to tell" her
story).
169 Constructing a client's goals objectively serves professional players' self-interest. It is
easier to formulate objective goals for a given type of dispute-because each similar dispute
becomes close to figible-than to spend additional time determining each client's subjective
preferences and then tailoring litigation strategies to pursue them. (Lawyers for wealthy clients
are highly paid in part to provide this sort of customized lawyering.) If claims and client
demands are sufficiently similar, attorneys and courts can improve efficiency by standardizing
the processing of cases. See Gary Bellow, Turning Solutions into Problems: The Legal Aid
&rperience, 34 NLADA BRIEFCASE 106 (1977) (noting that legal services lawyers responded
to case pressures and cut case processing time by narrowly and objectively defining client
interests and disfavoring client autonomy).
170 On socialization, see Tyler & McGraw, supra note 155, at 123-24. See also
HEUMANN, supra note 16, at 89-90 (describing the socialization of defense attorneys in early
practice); NARDULLI, supra note 42, at 156-57; Nelson & Trubek, supra note 7, at 175, 188.
171 Cunningham's case provides an example: when faced with a client and defense
attorney who invoked full procedural entitlements to vindicate subjective wishes at stake in a
minor ticket, the prosecutor and judge dismissed the case as not worth the trouble. See
Cunningham, supra note 157, at 1328-29, 1372. This calculation hinged on the case's
objective value (the likely sentence was a $50 fine), on disregard for the subjective utility
arising from procedural justice and dignitary concerns, and on disregard for public interests,
which might include clarifying whether police abuse occurred and a demonstration that such
abuse will come to light in court, rather than be governed by a sort of "de minimus norm"
pursuant to which such conduct is ignored in the context of minor offenses.
172 Cf Jacobs, supra note 167, at 101; Menkel-Meadow & Meadow, supra note 82, at
243 (noting the risk for lawyers that "[i]f the stakes are high, the [client's] problems can
become complex. If the client lacks money, his problems are likely to become routine");
Pepper, supra note 151, at 631 (noting that one barrier to moral dialogue among attorneys and
clients is the expense of that practice, because an attorney's time is money).
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Legal education's efforts to foster this approach confront a formidable
obstacle from practice norms that govern many practice settings for low income
parties. The pedagogy of client-centered counseling, and attorneys' individual
commitments to it, are likely to have most of their effects outside arenas of
practice regulated by norms and in those moments within practice when
attorneys have counseling and strategic options in spite of practice norms.
Ethical rules and legal training are relatively weak tools with which to confront
norms strongly enforced by local work groups, at least at the level of individual
attorney conduct.173
B. Public and Third-Party Interests
Against the dominant conception of the lawyer as solely the servant of client
autonomy stands a competing argument that lawyers also have a broader, public
role to serve public interests of justice and systemic interests of judicial
administration, including the equitable distribution of legal resources.174 Despite
the formal duty to represent clients zealously and with undivided loyalty, other
considerations inevitably affect lawyering actions; lawyers should
conscientiously confront that tension.175 Legal ethics scholars have examined a
range of approaches that attorneys should employ to weigh such competing
concerns. William Simon recently refined his work on ethical discretion in
lawyering in his book, The Practice of Justice: A Theory of Lawyer's Ethics,176
which offers the most deliberate strategy to the problem of weighing public,
third-party, and attorney interests against the client's wishes and merits of her
case. Simon argues that lawyers should calibrate their professional conduct based
on their assessments of the internal merit of the client's case, its relative merit
with regard to competing social concerns, and the lawyer's ability, relative to
other institutional actors, to help achieve substantive justice in the case.177 With
173 1 discuss below the possibilities for reforming norms and suggest coordinated group
action is the most promising approach in a difficult battle. See infira notes 202-21.
174 See KRONMAN, supra note 164, at 118, 134-46 (discussing lawyers' cooperative role
with judges to effectuate public norms in law); Simon, supra note 73, at 1092-94.
175 One suspects that one cause for distinction between client-autonomy models and
ethical-discretion models is that their proponents have in mind different lawyers and clients.
The ethical-discretion model is especially appropriate for elite lawyers serving wealthy clients;
those lawyers are most likely to be excessively loyal to client interests. Public defenders or
poverty lawyers are at risk for the opposite tendency, and the client-centered model aims to
ensure that they give sufficient loyalty to clients.
176 See generally SIMON, supra note 1.
1 7 7 See id at 138-42; see also Simon, supra note 73, at 1090-1119 (developing the
argument in the context of civil litigation); see generally William L Simon, The Ethics of
Criminal Defense, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1703 (1993) (making comparable arguments with regard
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somewhat different emphasis, Dean Anthony Kronman has urged that lawyers
adopt a "cooperative role" with judges in advancing "the administration of
justice" and the legal system's "integrity" and "well-being" by mediating law's
"public norms" with client interests.178
Practice norms often represent a tacit integration of interests other than the
client's into the lawyer's (and judge's) decisionmaldng.17 9 They frequently
reflect choices about how to allocate scarce legal resources based on conceptions
of substantive justice as well as attorneys' and judges' self-interest or ideological
preferences. In that sense they reflect one means of serving Simon's or
Kronman's goals, but this Article has shown how they imply judgments that do
not fit even these broader models of the lawyer's role.
This Article has noted that some norms strike these balances in more
defensible ways than others. A limited version of the trial-penalty norm, for
example, can be a legitimate response to the conflict between the judicially
created entitlement and the legislature's underfunding of that right The doctrine
asserts the public value of jury trials with full resources, while the legislature
counters with a judgment that holds that value in much less regard. Under
Simon's or Kronman's conception, lawyers legitimately can confront this tension
and make substantive choices about resolving it in a manner that does not serve
only the interests of the current, individual client. Yet to the extent lawyers
extend the norm to serve interests and values beyond the competing ones offered
to criminal practice). But see SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 164, at 32-34, 56-58
(discussing and criticizing Simon's approach).
17 8 See KRONMAN, supra note 164, at 118, 134-46. Other scholars have argued that
lawyers should discuss effects that the case may have on the public interest and third parties
with the client These approaches similarly seek to adjust strategic lawyering decisions in light
of concerns other than the client's best interests, but they urge the lawyer to be a force of moral
suasion and should do so only with the client's assent. See SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note
164, at 40-54 (arguing for a model of counseling in which the lawyer acts as the client's
"fiend," raising moral issues); Kimberly E. O'Leary, Creating Partnership: Using Feminist
Techniques to Enhance the Attorney-Client Relationship, 16 LEGAL STUD. F. 207 (1992)
(arguing for more client input in lawyering decisions that involve nonclient interests).
Additionally, Anthony Alfieri, in a series of provocative articles arguing for the relevance of
race-conscious judgment in criminal practice, offers a defense attorney's duty to consider
public or community interests in racially charged criminal cases. See generally Anthony V.
Alfieri, Lynching Ethics: Toward a Theory of Racialized Defenses, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1063
(1997); Anthony V. Alfieri, Race Trials, 76 Tx. L. REV. 1293 (1998); Anthony V. Alfieri,
Race-Ing LegalEthics, 96 COLuM. L. REv. 800 (1996).
17 9 Corporate governance law mediates an analogous tension for managers between
pursuing exclusively the shareholders' interests and other stakeholders in the corporation such
as suppliers, employees, and the local community. (Some state statutes explicitly encourage
consideration of the latter interests.) See generally Symposium, New Directions in Corporate
Law, 50 WASH. & LEEL. REV. 1373 (1993).
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by appellate courts and legislatures--4o the extent a norm constricts trial access
to serve attorneys' or judges' self-interest or preference' 80---the norm does not
embody legitimate judgments even within Simon's or Kronman's approaches.
In contrast, the fair-dealing norm, while it superficially resonates with
substantive justice considerations that are legitimate concerns in Simon's model,
in fact is illegitimate even on this view. There is little indication that the defense
lawyer is much better positioned than other players or the system generally to
achieve substantive justice, one of Simon's key criteria for departing from purely
client-focused practice.' 81 To the extent such a practice (which, recall, entails a
defense lawyer offering a harsher punishment for her client) reflects the
assessment of the merits of a client's case that Simon calls for,182 it points to the
risks for misuse of ethical discretion. The fair-dealing norm suggests how merit
assessment of a client's case becomes conflated with lawyer self-interest or
perversion of professional role.
Norms, then, are an unreliable mechanism for accommodating the
competing interests that the ethical discretion model puts in lawyers' hands. That
model places responsibility on individual attorneys, who must make new ethical
judgments for each. Norms remove those discretionary judgments both from the
attorney and the from the level of case-by-case decisionmaking. Difficult moral-
political calculations are resolved through norms that govern entire classes of
cases and clients. Norms, like legal rules, are general standards that do not fit all
specific cases well.183 They set presumptive policies with little regard for the
relative, competing concerns within each case, the locus at which ethics scholars
focus the decision.18 4 Norm judgments are made by insular professional
communities ill-suited for either public, deliberative decisionmaking, or the
moral-professional judgment called for by Simon's discretionary approach.
Attorneys committed to an ethical practice in conflict with norms can do so only
180 See supra note 129 and accompanying text (discussing Lynch's study of two counties
with widely varying trial rates attributable largely to local norms).
181 See SIMON, supra note 1, at 140 ("Mhe more reliable the relevant procedures and
institutions, the less direct responsibility the lawyer need assume for the substantive justice of
the resolution; the less reliable the procedures and institutions, the more direct responsibility
she needs to assume for substantive justice.).
182 See id. at 50-51, 138-39.
183 Cf Resnik, supra note 35, at 408, 419 (noting that managerial judging relies on
generalizations that do not fit all cases well). Mediating the fit between general rules and
specific cases and contexts is the task of statutory interpretation. See generally WIunAM N.
EsKRmGE, JR., DYNAMIc STATUTroRY INTERPRETATION (1994).
184 The Supreme Court has also stated that "wide latitude" for individualized judgment
rather than "detailed guidelines" or a "checklist" for lawyering decisions is essential for defense
counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688-89 (1984). Strong norms, like
formal mandates, could diminish that range for judgment.
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at a cost. Yet ethical discussions generally give little attention to such structural
factors that have tremendous effects on attorney practice choices.185
V. EXPLANATIONS FOR NORMS AND BARRIERS TO REFORM
A. Behavioral Explanations for Norms
1. "Herd Behavior'" Model
There is often little incentive to change from an orderly consensus,186
particularly when attorneys have constructed notions of justice to privilege
existing practices, and when resources partly do constrain some practices.
Behavioral psychology suggests a couple of ways that norms maintain their
force. According to a model of "herd behavior," actors tend to reduce
reputational costs by opting for standard practices, to some extent ignoring their
own information and judgment.18 7 If the choice is wrong, at least one is not
wrong alone; the choice was a widely selected one, which confirms its ex ante
prudence.188 For example, a norm that entitles one to a trial only for reasonable
disputes makes the trial option risky. The attorney risks not only the sanction of
the trial penalty (borne by the client) but also the reputational injury of displaying
poor judgment (or poor "client control") 189 that "wastes" public resources. There
is little reputational cost, in contrast, to urging a plea or bench trial, which are not
only more common but-in the case of pleas--resolve the case such that
evidence will not usually come to light to prompt reassessment of the attorney's
advice.190 The risks and payoffs to the lawyer are asymmetrical. The potential
185 Simon makes brief reference to financial constraints that some lawyers face in
deciding whether to accept clients and how to litigate their cases. See Simon, supra note 73, at
1094. For accounts documenting the effects that practice settings and lawyer incomes have on
ethical conduct and how client-centered a lawyer's practice is, see generally HEiNZ &
LAUMANN, supra note 81.
186 See NARDU.L Er AL, supra note 15, at 324 ("Once a consensus has been forged in a
community, there is little desire, or incentive, to improve upon it. Not only would that take time
and effort, but also by adhering to the standard disposition for the routine case, 'no one gets
hurt too badly."); Galanter, supra note 147, at 117.
187 See, eg., Abhijit Banaedjee, A Simple Model of Herd Behavior, 107 QJ. ECoN. 797
(1992).
188 See David Millon, Default Rules, Wealth Distribution, and Corporate Law Reform:
Employment at Will Versus Job Security, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 975,1033 (1998).
189The desirability of "client control" among attorneys in local courts is widely
documented. See, e.g., BIRD, supra note 167, at 196-97; FLEMMING ET AL., supra note 16, at
151-52; HEUMANN, supra note 16.
190 Note that in this setting, in contrast to other agency-principal relationships, the agent's
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costs of urging a client to accept a suboptimal plea are less than those of
demanding a trial which may end up being deemed "unreasonable" by other
professionals.191
Herd behavior is used to explain a variety of behavior, especially in agency
contexts, in which norms are not observed to play any role.192 Indeed, one could
imagine a regime-as surely exists in many jurisdictions-in which the
sanctions enforcing a norm against trials are not strong, but plea bargains are
nonetheless commonplace. Herd behavior could still explain (though only in
part) a preference for the less risky choice of plea over trial.
However, the herd behavior insight, applied to a setting characterized by
norms, reveals an additional function within a norms regime. The reputational
cost, against which herd behavior protects, serves as an ancillary sanction to
reinforce the norm. The attorney urges a plea not only to avoid a trial penalty
imposed on his client and perhaps other sanctions on himselt such as fewer court
appointments or reduced cooperation from prosecutors, but also to hedge against
the risk of tarnishing his reputation among other professionals. The insight
applies to other norms as well; herd behavior may increase observance of, say,
the discovery-motion or expert-funds norms.
2. Inertia Theory and Default Practices
In addition, attorneys like all people demonstrate a "status-quo bias"-they
prefer established options or pre-selected practices over ones that must be
affirmatively chosen. Building on extensive behavioral psychology research and
empirical studies of preferences in contract negotiation, Russell Korobldn has
posited an "inertia theory" that explains preferences for default rules or form
contract terms by a more general inclination for inaction over action.193 If they
(i.e., the attorney's) main concern is with his reputation with opposing attorneys and judges
more than with the principal (the client). Cf Millon, supra note 188, at 1034 (noting that
corporate agents fear innovative decisions because, if they turn out badly, it injures their
reputation with their principals). This argument is much weaker, of course, in attorney-client
settings in which clients are capable of better monitoring attorneys and have choices among
attorneys, and when attorneys depend more on developing reputations with clients.
191 Cf Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting:
Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347, 357-58
(1996).
192 See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 191, at 353-55 (describing attorneys dmfting
corporate contracts); Millon, supra note 188, at 1033-34 (describing corporate agent's
negotiation of job security terms); see also Jeffrey Zwiebel, Corporate Conservativism, Herd
Behavior and Relative Compensation, 103 J. POL. ECON. 1 (1995) (describing investment
decisions).
193 Korobkin, Inertia and Preference, supra note 5, at 1605.
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care strongly enough for an alternative to a default rule or standard term, people
will of course negotiate for it. However, when preferences for alternatives are
modest, the status-quo bias can lead many not to act on the preference. When the
preferred term is also the default term, the preference becomes much stronger.
Korobkin concludes from experimental data that "the bias in favor of default
terms is at least partially the result of deeply ingrained psychological instincts
that cause us to favor inaction over action, even when doing so is not profit
maximizing. '194 One implication for contract negotiation is that whichever party
is able to define the status quo position with an initial proposal of draft terms will
likely enjoy a substantial bargaining advantage.19s As is true of the herd behavior
thesis, opting for the status quo is one strategy to minimize future regret.
The insight for practice norms is obvious. If one thinks of a given practice
shaped by norms as a default practice fashioned by local legal culture, one would
expect attorneys to demonstrate a bias in favor of the status quo practice.
Consider again the trial norm. Not all clients want trials, but some preferences
are shaped by the extreme constriction on trials that prevails among lawyers and
judges in many places. However, even the increase in jury trial rates that Lynch
found in his comparison of jurisdictions could lead to client choices that are less
influenced by practice norms-and to more zealous representation. 196 Even
within tight budgets, jurisdictions could encourage bench trials (or trials by lay
magistrates) over pleas simply by moving to a "default practice" of such trials in
a large portion of cases. The shift would affect attorney judgment in counseling
clients and probably also client preferences as well. Similarly, one would expect
to see attorneys much more readily follow the routine of filing discovery motions
if that were a standard practice choice encouraged (or just not discouraged) by a
norm. As this Article discusses below, these insights suggest some means for
reforming norms to foster better practice by attorneys.
3. Path Dependency
This explanation accords with "path dependency" theory 197 as applied to
practice norms. Practices that vary substantially in comparable settings may
result from earlier conditions or prior "norm leaders" (for example, a chief
judge) who set a standard that continues even as conditions change. At an earlier
period, when norm leaders set given norms, expectations were built around them.
A jurisdiction came to assume that only, say, three percent of trials would be
194Id at 1593.
195 See id. at 1608.
196 See Lynch, supra note 20, at 125-26; see also supra note 129 and accompanying text.
197 See Mark j. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV.
641,653-60 (1996).
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resolved by jury trials instead of thirty percent. (A normative baseline was
inferred from that fact--only three percent should be resolved by juries.) Court
budgets and work expectations were set accordingly. Judges felt an entitlement
to be on the bench only fifteen hours a week instead of thirty. Court
administrators and legislators came to expect x number of cases to be processed
by y number of judges. Attorneys accepted as an economic premise of their
practices that x number of cases would be resolved quickly. The multiple ways
that various players build expectations around that regime and come to rely on it
create constituencies against change' 98 In this way a "path" chosen at an earlier
time becomes entrenched.
As Mark Roe has noted, a given path creates a tacit information set; actors
have less information about alternatives not chosen. This problem of asymmetric
information means a group "cannot think effectively about the alternative path
because it lacks the vocabulary, concepts or even belief that the other path could
exist."199 Attorneys may be unable to imagine, for example, that more cases
could be tried, with fuller discovery, with existing resources.200 Status quo
practices become harder to change.
B. Social Meaning ofNorms
Practice norms also sustain their force through their social meaning. Norms
always have meaning; they show what we value or believe.20 1 The norm
permitting ex parte contacts, for instance, has an important signaling effect.
Formal ex parte prohibitions carry a meaning of distrust of the judge (and
perhaps also the attorney) engaging in the contact. It implies that the judge will
not be fair or decide the case on its merits, merely because he engaged in a
conversation about it at some earlier point. It insults the judge's integrity.
198 See Roe, supra note 197, at 651-52 (discussing the "public choice' feature of path
dependence and noting that "[w]hen a society chooses one economic path over another, it also
creates a political dynamic by maling economic incumbents").
199 Roe, supra note 197, at 651 (discussing the information barrier created by path
choice); see also ROBERTO MANGAHERJA UNGER, FALSE NEcEssnIY (1987). This observation
seems true even in the context of local court communities, in which there is extensive variation.
Although players in one court often need only look to a neighboring county or state for
different arrangements, the availability of such information does not translate into an equal
choice. The regime in which one was trained and lives is more vivid. In addition, coordination
problems-getting multiple actors to be persuaded by the wisdom of a change--remain.
200 See HEUMANN, supra note 16, at 89-91.
201 Scholars have given specific attention to the meaning of norms as attention to norms
in legal scholarship has increased. See Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and
Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 362 (1997); Lessig, supra note 56, at 997-1007; Lawrence
Lessig, Social Meaning and Social Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2181,2182-83 (1996).
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similar claims very differently; comparable claims arise in different contexts and
implicate different nonlegal consequences. 53 Just as market prices are in fact
only objective approximations of the subjective value of goods to any given
contracting party,154 the objective value of a legal claim--the money damages in
a civil action, or restitution and punishment at issue in a criminal action-are
only second-best approximations of a claim's subjective value to a client. Many
legal disputes, and the processes used to resolve them, 155 have significant
personal or emotional value to disputants.156 A legal strategy motivated by
concern for a party's subjective preferences with regard both to outcomes and
procedure will often be different from one focused on a rational maximization of
153 See BINDER ET AL., supra note 2, at 3; id at 5-15 (describing how nonlegal concerns
can change client preferences on legal strategies and options); cf. Pildes, supra note 55, at 937,
955-59 (discussing how citizen preferences, with respect to goods regulated by public policy,
vary with context and cultural values).
154 See ELuICKsON, supra note 11, at 170-74.
155 Cf. Tyler, supra note 81, at 104-05 (finding a strong focus on procedural fairness
even among criminal defendants facing long sentences). For a description of a client in a civil
case who expresses subjective preferences in a divorce case that include 'Tight[ing the]
injustice" of an improper restraining order and "an acknowledgment that she has been treated
unjustly," while her attorney pushes the case toward an objective value focused on "the real
business" of a property settlement, see SARAT & FELSrINER, supra note 29, at 94. See also
Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 759 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that a litigant may
want to "press the argument that he is innocent' despite easier means of victory or 'isist on
certain arguments for political reasons"); Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives:
Recognizing Client Narrative in Case Theory, 93 MICH. L. REV. 485, 565-66 (1994) (arguing
for collaboration between clients and lawyers in formulating case theory and noting clients may
choose one theory over another for noninstrurnental reasons such as "vindication," "personal
integrity," or the chance to "establish an important legal principle!).
Noninstrumental concerns play a large role in justice system experiences; people focus on
fair processes as much as, or more than, outcomes. See TYLER, supra note 81, at 101, 112, 116.
Procedural justice is the primary influence on judgments about justice processes and
satisfaction with third-party decisions. See id at 107; see also Tom R. Tyler, Psychological
Models of the Justice Motive: Antecedents of Distributive and Procedural Justice, 67 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 850, 857 (1994). People place high value on "process
control," the opportunity to speak to those who control case outcomes in an attempt to
influence the decision. See Tom R. Tyler & Kathleen M. McGraw, Ideology and the
Interpretation of Personal Experience: Procedural Justice and Political Quiescence, 42 J.
Soc. IssUES 115, 121 (1986).
156 See BINDER ET AL, supra note 2, at 5-15. Indeed, because people forgo litigation of
most legal claims, one might think that those claims that are in fact litigated, at least in some
class of cases (torts, for instance), arise because litigants disproportionately place considerable
subjective value on vindication beyond formal money or liberty claims. See Richard L. Abel,
The Real Tort Crisis-Too Few Claims, 48 OHIO ST. W. 443, 447 (1987).
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objectively defined resources.15 7
This point corresponds with broader problems in determining values that
affect public policymaking. Expert cost-benefit analysis tends to impose
objective assessments of values that conflict with popular, subjective valuations.
Values are functions of social contexts from which they cannot be abstracted.158
Experts tend to understate the value of "soft" variables. In regulatory
policymaking, those may include the value of clean air, better health, and
increased auto safety; parties to litigation may have any number of comparably
soft values, arising, for example, from dignitary or vindication concerns. 159
157 Recent scholarship on client counseling and lawyering theory, as well as teaching
approaches to those topics, has given some attention to this problem and provides illuminating
cases studies. See Clark D. Cunningham, The Lawyer as 7ranslator, Representation as Text:
Towards an Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1298, 1300-01 & rn.7-11
(1992) (citing sources); Tanina Rostain, The Company We Keep: Kronman's The Lost Lawyer
and the Development of Moral Imagination in the Practice of Law, 21 L. & Soc. INQUIRY
1017, 1033 & nn.51-57 (1996) (book review) (discussing sources).
Clark Cunningham has descnbed a misdemeanor criminal matter that held significant
dignitary and emotional value for the client. See Cunningham, supra at 1303-31. The client
was an African-American man stopped in his car at night by two white policeman. Based on
the client's account, the police were excessively rough and rude, stopped him on a pretext
because he drove an expensive car, and fabricated a charge of disturbing the peace because the
client exercised his right not to cooperate with the officers. See id. Cunningham recounts his
own misperception of the client's understanding and valuation of the case. Despite
Cunningham's creative attempts to serve his client's preferences, see id. at 1326-28
(recounting a proposal to let the client cross-examine a key witness in a jury trial aimed at
"giving him a voice in the courtroom" and achieving his goal of "restoration of his dignity'),
the client was extremely dissatisfied with both his lawyer's representation and the substantive
outcome, which was objectively very favorable-the charge was dismissed. See id at 1328-
30. In addition to formal exoneration, the client wanted a process that acknowledged the moral
wrong done to him by the officers. See id. That strong client preference could be met through
the mechanism of a hearing on a suppression motion or a trial. Yet that requires an attorney not
only to learn the subjective preferences of his client but also to honor them by resisting routine
strategies for case resolution, routines that may be enforced by norms. See also Caplin &
Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 647 (1989) (Blackmun, L, dissenting) (noting the
need for a "maverick" lawyer to resist judges' "preference for nonconfrontational styles of
advocacy" enforced by sanctions).
158 See Pildes, supra note 55, at 955-65. See also, e.g., Elizabeth Anderson, Values, Risks
and Market Norms, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 54, 60-62 (1988) (discussing how workers assess
workplace risks, and how those assessments vary depending on the particular job and the
personal value they place on the work); id at 959.
159 Similarly, in risk analysis, lay judgments depend much more upon the contextual
features in which the risk arises than upon expert judgments, such that quantitatively identical
risks are treated differently depending on such factors as whether one has control over
exposure to the risk and what benefits one receives from the risky activity. See Richard H.
Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. Cfu. L. REV. 1, 58-61
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more judicial involvement, and rising case loads that prompted concern about
docket backlogs and efficient disposition. Resnik emphasized the costs of these
practices, however, which include judicial action that shapes disposition outside
of public or appellate scrutiny, sub silentio rule changes, a reduced emphasis on
due process values, unmeasured trade offs of quality for efficiency, and the risk
of judicial bias stemming increased power and informal information
gathering. 211Another widespread development in civil litigation, alternative
dispute resolution, also stems in large part from increasing disfavor of
adversarial procedure. ADR critics have emphasized prospects that informal
approaches may be coercive, particularly among parties with unequal power, and
that such methods lead to less concern for substantive rights and justice.212 Other
than commercial arbitration,213  ADR mechanisms were developed
disproportionately for lower income parties and others with traditionally less
access to the justice system. Moreover, ADR emerged just as these groups were
gaining unprecedented access to courts in the 1960s and 1970s as a result of civil
rights, consumer rights, and legal aid movements; they were making gains
there.2 14 In some contexts, ADR restricts the power that such litigants found in
the legal process. 215
Practice norms in criminal courts share much with these civil practice
developments. Norms imply a similar disfavor for the legal entitlements
available to non-elite litigants. Like ADR, norms are most pervasive in those
court settings that serve low income parties. (Their wealthier opponents with
larger volumes of litigation, such as landlords or creditors, were the constituency
that most favored ADR.) Norms facilitate the same trade off of public and party
values for speedy case disposition.216 They carry similar risks to ADR and
211 See id at 380,407,414,426,430-31 & 440; see also Fiss, supra note 64, at 1088-89.
2 12 See Richard Abel, The Contradictions of Informal Justice, in THE POLMCS OF
INFoRMAL JUSTICE 7-13, 270 (Richard Abel ed., 1982); AUERBACH, supra note 207, at 124;
Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE LJ. 1545
(1991); Nader, supra note 208.
213 Commercial arbitration is now largely viewed as a successful mechanism for disputes
among firms, though parties tend to have substantial and roughly equal resources. Auerbach
has argued that the system evolved early in the century among corporations to evade the
strictures of formal law and resolve disputes within the shared values and interests of the
business community, eventually meeting public resistance. See AUERACH, supra note 207, at
101-14.
214 See id. at 97-100, 124; Nader, supra note 208, at 2-4.
215 Trina Grillo, for example, in a prominent article, stressed the dangers to women in
family mediation, which she described as a coercive process hidden from public view that
masks inequities of power and responsibility. See Grillo, supra note 212.
216 Cf Nader, supra note 208, at 2-3 (discussing the concept of "intense influence" to
which "[e]ven lawyers and judges may be subjected," that encourages the view of formality,
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managerial judging and often occur even further beyond public scrutiny.2 17
This Article does not mean to imply here a broad condemnation of ADR,
just as criticism of norms does not entail opposition to all informal process or
settlement (nor do Resnik's criticisms of managerial judging condemn all
negotiation and settlement). One cannot assert with confidence that formal or
informal process, adversarial or cooperative models, always will be superior over
a range of cases and contexts. Courts can be alienating and inaccessible, but they
can also be powerful tools for parties otherwise lacking power. Informal forums
can increase access and innovate relational, dialogic disputing processes, but
they can also be coercive processes that deprive parties of procedural protections,
obscure justice claims, and hide the substantive standards that guide case
resolutions.218 Practice norms pose similar threats (and promises) that must be
evaluated in context, but it is clear that they sometimes undermine important
public values and deprive parties of beneficial entitlements.
The shift in the content of both professional role and formal process in all
three developments are characteristic of "harmony models" of law, which
substitute trust, conciliation, informality, and reciprocity for adversarial disputing
and overt conflict. Legal anthropologist Laura Nader describes "harmony
ideology" as "a rhetoric of peace through consensus" and "the belief that
harmony in the guise of compromise or agreement is ipso facto better than an
adversary posture."219 Jerold Auerbach has traced recurring turns toward
harmony models over adversarial formality in American legal history and has
described its use (and the "deleterious effects of coerced informality") for freed
slaves after the Civil War, factory workers at the turn of the last century, and for
the inner city poor in recent decades through ADR. 22 0
Harmony models depend upon a context, shared by disputants, of trust,
rough equality of power, and shared substantive values. Parties mediate claims
through a common set ofjustice commitments that are important enough to them
that they may forgo some portion of their claims (which they could vindicate
with adversarial means) to sustain them or serve a larger, common interest 221
When those justice values arise from within the parties' community, informal
approaches can be empowering.2 22 When their source is outside the parties'
rights, and adversary process as bad and conciliatory cooperation as good).
2 17 See Abel, supra note 212, at 267; Nader, supra note 208; Resnik, supra note 58.
2 18 See Abel, supra note 212, at 267; Nader, Harmony Models, supra note 207, at 50-53.
219 See Nader, supra note 208, at 1, 3 (emphasis added).
220 See AuERBACH, supra note 207, at 145-46.
221 Seeid at4, 16, 145-46.
222 See GREENHOUSE, supra note 207 (describing a small town religious community's
aversion to conflict, formal law, and adversarial justice in the name of shared, faith-based
conciliation); NADER, supra note 207, at 1-9 (concluding from a study of Talean Zapotec
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community or they mask inequities of power, however, harmony models can
have a repressive effect, because the justice values that guide dispute resolution
conflict with parties' interests or public values. 2 23
This is the risk with practice norms created by professionals without parties'
input.2 24 The justice notions with which lawyers imbue practice norms fill the
role of the substantive baseline on which consensus is achieved. Those notions,
however, are not always shared by litigants or formal law. Norms may
restructure adversary processes and attorney-client relationships to produce the
same disadvantages that other harmony models, including many forms of ADR
have on parties with little power.225 In the name of underlying justice standards,
harmony models of law sometimes suppress conflict and a party's efforts to
vindicate its position2 26 This move is not per se condemnable, if lawyers are
only confronting a conflict between a formal entitlement like the jury trial right
and underftmding for that right Often, though, norms are not solely resource-
driven or based on justice commitments grounded in public values.2 27 In line
with harmony models, norms pacify advocates working in an adversary system
communities in Mexico that harmony models are a means to resist domination from outside
colonial forces). Another example is commercial arbitration, first created by business interests
after World War I. That system can be viewed as commercial interests' attempt to resist control
of law with a dispute resolution regime devised from the shared values and interest of the
business community. When public sentiment grew less trusting of business in the Great
Depression and wanted to ensure more control and supervision, private arbitration was forced
to give way to formal law. See AUMEACH, supra note 207, at 101-14.
223 See Grillo, supra note 212; Nader, supra note 208, at 5. Harmony models can have
any variety of political effects or ideological uses, just as adversarial models can. Nader, among
others, has criticized the ADR movement as a means to pacify and contain the assertion of
rights and claims for justice zealously pursued by less powerful groups (racial minorities,
women, environmentalists) in the 1960s. See Nader, supra note 208, at 2; Laura Nader,
Controlling Processes: Tracing the Dynamic Components of Power, 38 CURRENT
AN oHRoI'OLoGY 711, 713-14 (1997) [hereinafter Controlling Processes]; Laura Nader, The
Crown, the Colonialists, and the Course of Zapotec Village Law, in HISTORY AND POWER IN
THE STUDY OF LAW 320, 334-39 (June Starr & Jane F. Collier eds., 1989) [hereinafter Village
Law].
224 Of course, this is holding aside the influence that wealthier parties have due to their
financial control over attorneys. See discussion infra Part V.D.1.
2 25 Cf Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 647 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (arguing the need for "the maverick and the risk taker" defense attorney who
"might displease ajudge [with a] preference for nonconfrontational ... advocacy").
22 6 See Nader, Harmony Models, supra note 207, at 52 (summarizing studies).
227 Recall that the fair-dealing norm is a clear sell out of the client for collegial notions of
justice. See supra Part E.D. Also, what attorneys in Engel's study viewed as 'fair" and
"mature" norms of tort settlement that left people 'largely more happy" conflicted with the
views of tort plaintiffs themselves, many of whom felt that their settlements were too low. See
Engel, supra note 136, at 854.
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and repress clients' claims.2 28
D. Inadequate Constraints on Norms
1. Agency Problems
The preceding explanations suggest how norms are sustained. Yet at least
two mechanisms should limit their detrimental effects. One check on norms that
harm client interests is clients themselves. However, while agency problems
abound in attorney-client relations, they vary considerably with the type of client
and the practice setting: lower income clients are more likely to suffer the
detrimental effects of practice norms.
Incentives for lawyers to serve client interests vary tremendously 2 29 Clients
who have ongoing relationships with attorneys and are more capable of
monitoring their counsel suffer fewer agency costs,230 especially if they offer
repeat business. Wealthy clients have more control of their attorneys,.2 31 who in
turn have the least autonomy from clients and are least likely to compromise
228 See Nader, Harmony Models, supra note 207, at 50-53. ADR has been lauded as a
relational, empowering, and less stressful alternative to the alienating hostility and formality of
adversarial legal processes. Yet it has also been criticized as replicating and aggravating power
imbalances among parties. See, e.g., Grillo, supra note 212 (criticizing ADR for forsaking
justice claims for conciliation and becoming a tool to pacify aggressive assertion of rights from
less powerful and disenfranchised groups); see also, e.g., Abel, supra note 212, at 304-06;
Nader, Controlling Processes, supra note 223, at 713-14. This is not to say that adjudication,
though sometimes a powerful mechanism for assertion of rights, justice claims, or resistance to
the state, cannot also be alienating, an inadequate vehicle for articulating viewpoints, and
insufficiently accessible to the poor or powerless. See AUERBACH, supra note 207, at 12
(quoting William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional
Ethics, 1978 Wisc. L. REv. 29, 115).
229 Judges have different but partly analogous structural influences that encourage self-
interested action; practice norms help them save time, reduce work load, conserve court
budgets, and manage dockets by which they are evaluated. See BAUM, supra note 46, at 44-47,
55 (discussing the influence ofjudges' goals on reducing work loads); see also it at 23-44,
47-56 (discussing other influences on judicial behavior including court audiences, legal policy,
career concerns, and court situations). Those factors help explain judicial use of practice norms.
230 See KRTZER, supra note 16, at 126 (noting that "more sophisticated clients (generally
repeat player organizations) of hourly fee lawyers" exert more control over their counsel than
other clients).
2 31 See HEINZ & LAUMANN, supra note 81, at 104-09 (noting that the most prestigious
lawyers have the least control over their clients, while legal services attorneys and others
serving low income individuals are more likely to dictate to clients or operate free of close
client supervision); KRrrZER, supra note 16, at 126; SARAT & FELTrNER, supra note 29, at 20-
21 (reviewing literature).
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client interests.2 32 The wealthy client's future value to the attorney and ability to
replace the attorney in the legal services market make it worthwhile for the
attorney to defect from the courthouse group, breach norms, and perhaps suffer
whatever cost may be incurred as a result.233 Also, elite attorneys typically bill
wealthy clients at hourly rates. While that creates an incentive to overlitigate,
lawyers are also more likely to be attuned to clients' subjective preferences than
attorneys who serve lower income clients and are paid a flat salary, appointment
fee, or contingency fee.234 As a result, one expects fewer agency costs and anti-
client norms in elite settings.23
5
In practices dominated by lower income clients, in conirast, clients are much
232 See, e.g., ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WrTn POWER 269, 286 (1987). Allegiance to
a client's interest should not be confused with client-centered counseling. The latter is a process
of ensuring that clients have considered all legal and nonlegal options for action, and legal and
nonlegal consequences of those options, to arrive at a decision unaffected by the attorney's
preferences or values. Attorneys could still view themselves as fully dedicated to client
interests without facilitating client autonomy and decisionmaking in this manner. Nonetheless,
a commitment to client interests, along with the relative wealth of some clients (because client-
centered counseling is time consuming and costly, see Dinerstein, supra note 152, at 577-78),
should make client-centered counseling easier to practice. Yet behavioral biases may affect
attorney decisionmaking and lead to suboptimal representation even for these clients. See
Kahan & Klausner, supra note 191, at 352-64.
233 The value of the client's business reduces the differential between reward for
cooperation and punishment for defection to the point at which defection is more rational. See
Posner, supra note 106, at 139-42. Further, because even sophisticated clients may have
difficulty distinguishing between optimal attorney skill and effort on their behalf and case
outcomes, they may partially use outcomes to assess their counsel. Because wealthy clients
have options in the market for legal services, attorneys should put in more effort to obtain the
best outcomes for the client (i.e., forgoing trade offs of attorney self-interest orjustice notions).
234 See RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERCAN LAWYERS 204 (1989); SARAT & FELsTINER, supra
note 29, at 20-21 (summarizing several studies); HEINZ & LAUMANN, supra note 81, at 103-09
(summarizing findings that lawyers in criminal defense practice and other "low prestige"
practices are less constrained by client monitoring and ethics than lawyers in elite practice areas
such as securities, banking, and general corporate); SPANGLER, supra note 81, at 50 (describing
large law firm partners' view of their job as providing "custom tailoring" and "highly
individualized" service to provide an "exquisite fit for a particular situation"). These problems
are closely related to well-known trade offs of payment methods. See KRnrZER, supra note 16;
Earl Johnson, Jr., Lawyers Choice: A Theoreical Appraisal of Lifigation Investment
Decisions, 15 L. & SoC'YREv. 567 (1981).
23 5 Kronman worries that attorneys confronting competing interests and loyalties will too
often yield to the "temptation to resolve [the dilemma] by always putting the client's well-
being before the law's." KRONMAN, supra note 164, at 145. This temptation is much stronger
for lawyers of wealthy clients than those of low income ones, in whose cases countervailing
norms often create the bigger problem than excessive client allegiance. On agency problems
between lawyers and elite clients generally, see Ribstein, supra note 8, at 1709 & n.3 (citing
sources).
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less effective at keeping their lawyers from taking actions that are suboptimal for
the client. They typically lack the skill or experience as repeat players to monitor
their lawyers effectively.236 Because the attorneys are not economically
dependent on the low income client's repeat business, they can pursue divergent
interests, such as the need to maintain good relations with other attorneys and
judges. A flat salary or per-case fee creates an incentive to minimize time on
each case.237 Relatively poor clients suffer from the structural setting of their
attorneys' workplace238 and are more likely to encounter litigation settings with
practice norms that infringe on client interests. Practice norms, then, are partly a
function of variations in the political economy of practice settings.2 39
Agency problems are a focus of corporate law, and the comparison is telling.
The traditional assumption is that market competition compels firms to employ a
variety of strategic options, such as the primacy of shareholder value over other
corporate stakeholders. Yet in fact we find considerable variation in corporate
governance choices, along with evidence that preferred choices are not
necessarily compelled by markets.240 Similarly, one finds wide norm variation
236 Cf Richard A. Nagareda, Turning from Tort to Administration, 94 MICH. L. REV.
899, 930-38 (1996) (discussing the effects of agency problems between plaintiffs and
attorneys in mass tort actions).
237 See Sonia S. Chan, Note, ABA Formal Opinion 93-379: Double-Billing, Padding and
OtherForms ofOverbilling, 9 GEO. J. LEGALETHICS 611,627 (1996) (stating that flat fees lead
to "standardized, prepackaged groupings of cases" and diminish "individualized and nuanced
presentations of fine legal points") (citing Sarah Evans Barker, How the Shiftfiom Hourly
Rates Will Affect the Justice System, 77 JUDICATURE 201, 202 (1994)). Conversely, clients
paying for their own legal services have an incentive to avoid litigation options of marginal
utility. Those not paying their own bills may demand marginal options more often. Norms are
one attempt to regulate the latter situation. Legislatively imposed budget constraints on
indigent representation are another.
Because they frequently face the same opposing parties, salaried or contingency fee
attorneys may trade off present clients' interests and follow practice norms for future good
relations with opponents. See H. LAURENCE ROSS, SEIrLED OUT OF COURT 80-85 (1980);
Johnson, supra note 234.
238 See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, The Antinomies of Poverty Law and a Theory of
Dialogic Empowerment, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 659, 685 (1987-1988)
(discussing conventions for "process[ing] individual cases on a mass scale'; Bellow, supra
note 169, at 108 (concluding that excessive case load pressures on legal aid attorneys produced
routine processing of cases, diminished client control and autonomy, narrower definitions of
client concerns, and inadequate case resolutions).
239 Cf Nader, Harmony Models, supra note 207, at 42-44 (reviewing cross-cultural
studies on the "political economy of legal models').
240 See Roe, supra note 197, at 646 ("Multiple, equally efficient results might
abound....').
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even within comparable practice settings and client groups. 241 In contrast to
other countries where strong owners are more common, American corporate
structures are characterized by weak owners and strong managers. That creates a
greater risk of agency costs, because managers may not pursue the shareholders'
agenda, and weak owners are less effective at monitoring their agents. 242 Note
the analogy to attorneys and clients. Wealthy clients are strong owners and thus
are better at monitoring their agents; they also have more options to change
attorneys. Poor clients, in contrast, are weak owners. They have neither effective
exit nor voice options. 43 They cannot leave the local court system nor (in many
cases) freely opt for attorney-client relationships with lawyers unaffected by
practice norms.244 One expects them to suffer more agency costs.
One difference in the comparison, however, is that corporate governance and
finance evolved other mechanisms to suppress agency costs and compensate for
weak owners-tools such as independent boards, hostile takeovers, and
performance-based compensation for managers.2 45 For lawyers' clients,
however, nothing as rigorous exists to check arrangements against lawyer self-
dealing. Lawyers are regulated mostly by their clients or professionalism codes.
Yet ethical rules are least effective precisely where they are most needed-in
local practice settings with strong structural pressures to ignore formal rules of
professionalism.246
241 Scholars explain much of the variation by pointing either to nonmarket contextual
factors (differing government regulatory schemes or insurance markets, for instance, or
differently structured markets within given industries), or to varying effects of political and
ideological influences. See, e.g., RUDOLPH JR. PERrrz, HISTORY AS EXPLANATION: ANNALS OF
AMERICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY 231 (1997) (reviewing several book-length studies offering
different arguments for the effect of politics, ideology, and markets on the development of
corporate governance); MAK ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS 48-49 (1994)
(arguing for the influence of populist politics on American corporate governance). Other
explanations include behavioral choices not explained by market forces, such as the recent
interest in path dependence. See, e.g., Symposium, Path Dependency and Comparative
Corporate Governance, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 317 (1996); Millon, supra note 188, at 1025-40
(applying path dependence theory to problem of whether employment should be at-will or
secured).
24 2 See Roe, supra note 197, at 648-49.
24 3 See generally ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY (1970).
244 The above discussion of clients' subjective preferences shows a weakness of the voice
option. See supra Part IVA.
24 5 See Roe, supra note 197, at 647.
24 6 Cf William H. Simon, What Difference Does It Make Whether Corporate Managers
Have Public Responsibilities, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1697, 1701 (1993) (discussing an
analogous problem of corporate managers serving owner or public interests and expressing
skepticism that a "conception of the public interest" and reform of fiduciary doctrine will
change behavior without structural reform).
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2. Local Construction of Professionalism
Codes and customs of professionalism should counteract attorneys' and
judges' adherence to detrimental norms. Yet professionalism consists of much
beyond codes of ethics, which themselves are often written at a level of
generality to be of little use with regard to the sorts of practices regulated by
norms.247 The content of professionalism is constructed in local practice contexts
as well as in formal rules or bar association initiatives. "Ideal visions of
lawyering and the lawyer's role" are crucial parts of professionalism, Nelson and
Trubek argue, and these visions "affect the way lawyers organize their practices
and Understand their everyday life."'248
Conceptions of lawyer professionalism reflect "the arenas" in which they are
produced, that is, the particular institutional settings in which groups construct,
explicitly or implicitly, models of the law and of lawyering.... [D]ifferent
groups will develop different versions of the professional ideal in response to a
variety of political, ideological, and situational concerns....
Because the question of what lawyers should do is one that is addressed
every day in many sites, we see the social production of professionalism as a
complex process of interaction occurring in many arenas.249
Because local work settings are a primary site for the construction of the
Legal education's efforts to foster client-centered practice and teach lawyers a critical self-
awareness of practice choices face the same obstacle. Recent scholarship on the theoretics of
practice develop and discuss these goals and methodologies. See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri,
Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE W.
2107 (1991); Cunningham, supra note 157; Miller, supra note 155; Symposium, Theoretics of
Practice: The Integration of Progressive Thought and Practice, 43 HASGS L. 717 (1992).
247 The ABA Model Code provides that a lawyer's duty "both to his client and to the legal
system is to represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law." MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPoNSIBI.rY Canon 7-1 (1980). In 1983, theABA ModelRules modified the
zealous representation language. Model Rule 1.1 provides that "[a] lawyer shall provide
competent representation to a client Competent representation requires the legal knowledge,
skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation." MODEL
RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCt Rule 1.1 (1997). Model Rule 1.3 requires a lawyer to "act
with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client" MODEL RuLES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDucr Rule 1.3 (1997). The commentary adds that Rule 1.3 mandates "[a]
lawyer should act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in
advocacy upon the clients behalf. However, a lawyer is not bound to press for every advantage
that might be realized for a client" Id. at cmt. 1.
248 Nelson & Trubek, supra note 7, at 178.
249 Id. at 179-80; see also id at 213 ("Lawyers' visions of their working life and working
relationships are intimately related to the kinds of organizations they construct and the roles
they play in political, economic, and social exchange.").
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working content of professionalism dictates, one sees that, far from
professionalism rules constraining norms, norms are one way that
professionalism notions are defined and put in practice.250 (Recall the attorney
labeled unprofessional for complaining about ex parte contacts.)25 1 Functional
professionalism notions are one form of norms' social meaning.252 The study of
practice norms responds to Nelson and Trubek's call for "workplace studies" to
examine sources of professional ideology2 53 and confirms their assertion that
professionalism conceptions vary widely among localities despite uniform
formal rules. Norms are accommodations among the multiple forces of resource
availability, unworkable doctrines, conflicts among implicit public norms,
variations in attorney-client relations, and lawyers' self-interests and ideological
preferences. Norms are more than empirical observations of practices to mediate
material constraints. They have normative content that becomes a critical part of
professionalism's functional dictates.254 They are a constitutive part of
professionalism content, rather than an autonomous practice governed by formal
professional rules.
VI. VARIATION IN PRACnTCE NORMS AND PROSPECTS FOR REFORM
The extensive study by social scientists of legal pluralism-variation in law
practice despite uniform legal rules and similar practice conditions-confirms
that norms are far from uniform across contexts 55 Comparable jurisdictions can
250 Cf BAUM, supra note 46, at 19 (arguing that judges are not always aware of the goals
that motivate them); Robert Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Practice in the Age of American
Enterprise, 1870-1920, in PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA 110
(Gerald Geison ed. 1983) (reporting that attorneys had a "deeply ingrained suspicion" of being
depicted as "intellectuals producing ideology" because they "think of themselves as practical
persons occupied with practical affairs"); Menkel-Meadow & Meadow, supra note 82, at 253
(finding from empirical research a "potential gap between the factors articulated by attorneys as
motivating their legal resource allocation decision ... and those factors that may actually quite
latently influence those decisions"). But see generally Sunstein, supra note 70, at 918 (noting
that people sometimes reject norms after "reflective judgments").
2 51 See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text
2 52 See supra Part V.B.
253 Nelson & Trubek, supra note 7, at 179.
2 54 See HEINZ & LAUMANN, supra note 81, at 71 (arguing that attorneys in lower tiers of
the bar may violate ethical rules more often on behalf of clients because clients can demand
such conduct from attorneys with little economic security); see generally Nelson & Tnibek,
supra note 7; Vaughan, supra note 18, at 25-34 (emphasizing the structural and contextual
influences on decisionmaking).
255 See FLEMMDNG ETAL, supra note 16, at 1,205-06. This has been implicit in studies of
norms generally;, Ellickson did not suggest that the norms employed by ranchers in Shasta
County described the conduct ofallranchers. See ELLICKSON, supra note 11, at 1.
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have widely varying practices, characterized by great variations in their levels of
cooperation or formality and adversarial approaches, as well as in the content of
norms.2 56 Some practice norms that save court and attorney resources are often
not products of necessity, despite the perceptions of their adherents. 257
One implication of legal pluralism is the potential for change in the ways
local practice groups operate and the values to which they give priority despite
the behavioral, ideological, and social constraints on norm change noted
above.258 (Hold aside for the moment norms that respond to resource
constraints.) Coordination problems discourage individual attorneys from
challenging norms alone. 259 Still, legal pluralism suggests that, with relatively
little change in the funding of practice settings, "norm entrepreneurs"--who
typically must be leading figures, such as judges, chief prosecutors, or head
defenders--can reduce the level of undesirable practice norms; they can replace
the undesirable forms of cooperative and informal behavior that undercut litigant
interests with more adversarial conduct that protects those interests and legal
values.260 They can encourage greater use of legal entitlements to vindicate
client claims and preferences.
256 This variation is reflected in the evolution of empirical scholarship on state criminal
court practice, especially by public defenders or court-appointed attorneys. An early view, not
entirely discredited (especially among practitioners), suggested that defense attorneys who
were regular insiders in a local court could capitalize on their close relationships with judges
and prosecutors to gain maximum advantage for clients. See NARDULLI ET AL., supra note 15,
at 320-21; NARDULLI, supra note 42, at 3-33; RH. Smith & Herbert Ehrmann, The Criminal
Courts, in CRIMAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND (Roscoe Pound & Felix Frankfuter eds., 1921). A
second, more recent analysis characterizes such defense attorneys as "cop out artists" who sell
short the interests of their clients to maintain personal advantages within the courthouse work
group. See ABRAHAM BLUMERG, CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1967); NARDULI Er AL., supra note 15,
at 322-23; Jerome Skolnick, Social Control in the Adversary System, 11 J. CONFLICT RESOL
52(1967).
257 See Lynch, supra note 20, at 116; see also Cams & Kruse, supra note 129, at 316-17
(describing widely different rates of plea bargaining between Fairbanks and Anchorage,
Alaska, and attributing the difference largely to the chief prosecutors' differing views on the
desirability of bargains rather than on resource constraints); Schulhofer, supra note 116, at
1085-86 (concluding from empirical studies that about one quarter of felony defendants would
want to plead guilty even without inducements, and that 75% of felony cases could be resolved
by bench trials with only small increases in judicial resources).
258 See Sunstein, supra note 70, at 909 (discussing norm entrepreneurs).
259 See Lessig, supra note 56, at 991-1016 (discussing collective action problems related
to social meaning that impede norm change).
260 See FLEMMING Er AL., supra note 16, at 8 ("Work group autonomy is not inevitable, it
evolves out of the policy choices of the bench, bar, and prosecutor."); see also id at 19 ('The
leadership of individual actors and the organization of collective action, however, are the
means through which contexts are created and maintained.").
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Examples abound. One can easily find practice settings in which ex parte
contacts with judges are not routine. Lynch's study suggests that trial rates can
increase significantly merely through the leadership of key judges in a
jurisdiction. 61 The study of DuPage County's criminal courts reported an
"insurgent" prosecutor who withdrew key rewards for cooperative behavior-
open file discovery, plea bargain discounts-and thereby forced a more
adversarial practice in the jurisdiction.262 District attorneys in comparable
Alaska localities implemented a statewide plea bargaining ban with different
levels of commitment, resulting in very different plea bargaining rates. 2 63 To
encourage zeal by his staff attorneys, a federal public defender issued a
memorandum declaring the court and federal prosecutors to be "our enemies"
and reiterating a "long-standing offer" of cash rewards for attorneys threatened
with or held in contempt of court.264
Relatedly, the calculations of attorney and judicial self-interest that motivate
some norms are themselves contingent.265 Some norms serve desires to save
time and enjoy nonconfrontational work relations. Yet some attorneys desire
more trials, Some gain fulfillment from zealously serving client interests, from
fulfilling formal professional roles as advocates,2 66 and even from challenging
261 See Lynch, supra note 20, at 130.
One of my students spent his summer as a clerk for a municipal judge whose court had
jurisdiction to conduct both civil and criminal jury trials. The student reported that his judge
frequently presided over trials and hoped to set an informal record for the most jury trials
supervised in a year by a municipal judge. He added that his judge disparaged another judge in
nearby municipal court, who rarely has trials in his court. (The student was told by his judge
that the neighboring judge had no jury trials in the first six months of the year.) The student's
judge specifically reported that the neighboring judge used explicit trial penalties to discourage
criminal trials, indicating a plea would receive a light sentence but a loss at trial would receive
a sentence near the maximum. See Telephone Interview with Michael DeFibaugh (July 13,
1998). The contrast, assuming it is accurately reported (on some points through two or three
levels of hearsay), demonstrates the considerable leeway for norm entrepreneurs within
systems that likely have modest budgets. For better documented examples ofjudges' relative
willingness to allow trials, see, for example, FLEMMING ET AL., supra note 16, at 69, 105-08.
262 See NARDULLU ET AL, supra note 15, at chs. 5-6 (showing how norms can vary even
within similar community structures, revealing that norm entrepreneurs can establish
adversarial, zealous, and fairly formal practice environments even in close-knit communities).
263 See Cams & Kruse, supra note 129, at 317 (concluding that the "most important
condition" for a successful plea bargaining ban by prosecutors is "the personal decision" of"a
committed policy maker" such as the district attorney).
264 See Frankel, supra note 4 1, at 67.
265 See Sunstein, supra note 70, at 939-47 (discussing the contingency ofpreferences and
how "rational decision is very much a function of social norms").
2 66 See Menkel-Meadow & Meadow, supra note 82, at 244 (noting that an attorney may
gain reputational benefits from "pursuing reform rather than routine cases"). Both law school
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dominant practice norms.267 This raises possibilities for facilitating norm
revision in local practice settings to encourage those preferences. Courts could
alter reporting practices so that judges are not rewarded for moving through
dockets as quickly as possible-implicitly, with as few trials as possible-but
rather are encouraged to strive for disposing of some substantial portion of their
cases by trials. 268 One could imagine a setting in which judges lost esteem or
were otherwise sanctioned for holding too few trials,269 or in which prosecutors
were disqualified from plum assignments or judicial appointments if courts
found that they violated fair-trial doctrines by such actions as withholding
evidence.270
Similarly, office leaders could evaluate and promote attorneys who resolve
some higher portion of cases by trial or otherwise reorganize office culture.271
They could encourage involvement in specialized bar groups (for example,
criminal defender associations) that foster zealous advocacy. Lawyers might then
adopt the values of those subcultures they more strongly identify with and start
resisting some norms of local practice.272 (This may make them more willing to
endure personal costs, though they must also assess sanctions imposed directly
on the client) Low level staff attorneys have much less leeway to reshape
education and specialized professional associations (eg., National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers, National District Attorneys Association) often seek to foster such
preferences and commitments.
267 See Sunstein, supra note 70, at 918.
268 Cf. Resnik, supra note 35, at 379, 398-99, 404,427 (discussing the detrimental effect
of docket management techniques by federal judges in civil cases).
269 See supra note 261 (relating an anecdotal account of a local judge striving to set an
informal record for holding the most jury trials in a municipal court). This should also
influence judges to appoint attorneys who are willing to try cases.
270 Currently in some states, if not most, prosecutorial misconduct leading to reversible
error and heightening the risk of wrongful conviction-withholding exculpatory evidence or
prejudicial comments in trial--is no impediment to a judicial appointment See, e.g., Ken
Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Break the Rules, Be Promoted, CI. TRIB., Jan. 14,1999, at Al
(describing several cases in Illinois of prosecutors repeatedly found to have committed such
violations but who were subsequently elevated to the bench).
271 See Menkel-Meadow & Meadow, supra note 82, at 253-54 (concluding from an
empirical study that while "[l]egal services lawyers may perceive themselves as autonomous
individual professionals making rational resource allocation decisions.... much of their own
task initiation may be in response to or in pursuit of bureaucratic or programmatic directives or
goals"). For suggestions on maintaining zeal in a public defender office, see generally Charles
Ogletree, Beyond Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public Defenders, 106 HARV.
L. REV. 1239 (1993).
272 See Sunstein, supra note 70, at 918; see also id at 911-14 (arguing that people's
"interests" and preferences are socially contingent and constructed).
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norms-recall the new lawyer who challenged entrenched ex parte contacts273-
but they can at least resist by rejecting reputation sanctions, for instance, by
speaking well of those who are aggressive advocates while disagreeing with
norms that undermine client or public interests. In this way lawyers can weaken
norm enforcement.274
Note that most of these strategies attempt to change one mechanism that
sustains norms-their social meaning. Strategies that make aggressive defense
advocacy and fair prosecution (or judicial conduct to foster full and fair
adjudication) have a positive meaning that undercuts opposing norms. They take
away a potent enforcement tool, injury to reputation. Other enforcement
mechanisms remain, certainly, so norms are hard to change. However, changes
in norms' social meaning could spark productive shifts in other supporting
factors-the status-quo bias of default practices, herd-behavior baselines, and
then the working content of professionalism.
One must recall, however, the taxonomy of norms.275 Those norms on the
left side of the continuum, motivated by resource constraints, will not be
amenable to these strategies for change. Their causes are not contingent,
ideological commitments, so "norm entrepreneurs" have little power to affect
them. Yet those are the norms that; this Article has argued, are defensible
responses to resource imperatives created by political decisions. Those are the
norms that instead should prompt courts to re-evaluate legal rules. The practices
that are most normatively troublesome are also those most susceptible to reform.
VII. CoNcLusION: NoRMs AND PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Strong norms affect lawyers' capacity for critical evaluation and thereby
raise questions of personal responsibility. How blameworthy is one who adheres
to the norms that dominate one's local culture, and that sometimes can be
breached only at significant cost? The answer for attorneys practicing in norm-
laden settings is much the same as for criminal actors in local environments that
foster lawbreaking conduct. "Rotten social background" does not serve as a legal
excuse for crimes. Yet one cannot avoid noting the unfairness of judging a
person who was raised entirely in such a background by the same standards as a
person who lived in a context that nurtures respect for law.
For a sharper comparison, consider the pervasive culture of antisemitism that
273 Seesupra text accompanying notes 32-34.
274 Norms may change through a "snowball effect": when enough violations of the norm
occur-along with open endorsement of norm violations or condemnation of norm
adherence-more people are emboldened to violate the norm, eventually abolishing it See
Hasen, supra note 12, at 2151.
275 See supra Part III.E.
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Daniel Goldhagen describes in his book on German perpetrators of the
Holocaust, Hitler's Willing Executioner. 276 Goldhagen argues that so many
ordinary Germans participated in genocide because a long-standing "cultural
cognitive model" that labeled Jews evil and subhuman made it nearly impossible
for most people to avoid adopting that perspective and to see its immorality. The
cultural dominance of antisemitism explains, but does not excuse, Holocaust
perpetrators. The same assessment applies for the comparatively banal actions of
substandard lawyering. Lawyers as groups construct norms; though norms
become hard to recognize and resist at times, lawyers ultimately bear the
responsibility for changing them.
Assigning moral responsibility, however, does not necessarily prescribe the
most effective strategy for change. Community norms may not excuse criminal
actors from bad neighborhoods, but efforts to change those norms seem to be a
more promising route to preventing bad conduct than deterrence through
punishment for violators. For lawyers, structural approaches for weakening bad
norms are at least as promising as admonitions to follow formal professionalism
dictates, or pedagogical efforts to instill habits of reflective lawyering that will
themselves be shaped by norms.2 77 One cannot abandon holding individuals
responsible for their actions, but that does not mean that urging attorneys to
monitor their conduct with continual critical reflection is the best strategy for
changing behavior.
The nature of legal entitlements leaves a large role for practice norms.
Entitlements are available to parties but do not have to be used by them.
Attorneys and judges recognize that legal processes are a scarce resource; they
develop criteria on how to use them.278 The choice of how much the state, and
attorneys, should favor formal legal process over informal options is a complex
and value-laden decision made at the level of client representation as well as
doctrine or legislation, 2 79 particularly when conflicting policy choices compel
2 7 6 DANIEL JONAH GOLDHAGEN, HITLER'S WILLING EXECUTIONERS (1996).
277 particularly in client counseling and clinical programs, many legal educators
emphasize reflective lawyering, which entails self-evaluation of lawyering choices during and
after case completion or key practice events. See, eg., DONALD A. SCHON, THE REFLCrIVE
PRACrrTONER: HOw PROFESSIONALS THNK IN ACnoN (1983); Jay Feinman & Mare Feldman,
Pedagogy and Politics, 73 GEO. L.L 875, 894 (1985) (stressing the need to teach "critical self-
reflectiveness" to overcome the tendency of "[i]nexperienced lawyers... [to] imitate and adopt
prevailing practice standards when they lack confidence in their ability to evaluate critically the
quality of prevailing norms"); Donald A. Schon, Educating the Reflective Legal Practitioner, 2
CLINICALL. REV. 231 (1995).
27 8 See generally Simon, supra note 73.
279 Cf Peter H. Huang, A New Options Theory for Risk Multipliers ofAttorney's Fees in
Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1943 (1998) (discussing public interest
litigation via an options theory that recognizes that litigation consists of a series of options to
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responses such as norms to allocate scarce entitlements.280 Practice norms reveal
how fragile legal entitlements and processes can be as means to serve
adjudicative justice and party interests.
Not all norms are bad for clients or public interests. Practice norms
addressed in this Article are suspicious because they affect many of the very
entitlements intended to make the adversarial system more effective, and they
affect disproportionately the most vulnerable parties. Norms mediate the same
balance between competing goals of efficiency and substantive fairness that
appellate courts and legislatures balance in a variety of rules and doctrines.281
Yet they resolve that tension covertly, at the level of ordinary lawyering
decisions, judicial rulings, and trial court administration.282 Practice norms
sometimes strike defensible alternatives to formal rules, but the process by which
they evolve is untrustworthy. Thus, attorneys have special responsibility to
distinguish those instances in which norms facilitate good professional judgment
and those instances in which they undermine client interests or the public justice
system. The power and content of law depend upon an ongoing commitment to
maintain the mechanisms and values that give it life.
continue or settle).
280 See supra Part IH.C.
2 81 A recent example of a statute that makes explicit trade offs between efficiency and
fairness or accuracy is the 1996 Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2244-2266 (1996). Many civil procedure and evidence rules balance similar interests.
282 Cf. Fiss, supra note 64, at 1088-89 (arguing that ADR and settlement in civil cases
often undervalue public concerns inherent in legal adjudication). Some attorneys are aware that
norms ignore public values. See, e-g., HEUMAM, supra note 16, at 86 (showing a lawyer
justifying the trial-penalty norm by noting, '"I think substantial justice is worked out a good
percentage of the time: you kind of reach the right results for the wrong reasons.").
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